On the same date, five years later, Christof Heyns, then United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, warned countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council about a new threat to humanity: autonomous weapons systems. His presentation and report kickstarted multilateral discussions about how to address the next generation of warfare. Unfortunately, those talks have stalled, and there is a serious risk that rapid technological developments will outpace diplomatic results.

May 30 marks milestones for both these humanitarian disarmament moments: the 15th anniversary of the cluster munitions treaty, and the 10th of Heyns’ call for a moratorium on development and use of autonomous weapons systems, which would select and engage targets based on sensor processing rather than human inputs.

Although political and procedural hurdles have impeded progress on addressing autonomous weapons systems, proponents of a new treaty should look to the success of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the negotiations that led to it, for inspiration.

Convention on Cluster Munitions: An Effective Tool

Cluster munitions are large weapons that contain dozens or hundreds of smaller weapons known as submunitions. They kill and injure civilians at the time of attack, especially when used in populated areas, because the submunitions are dispersed widely. In addition, many of the submunitions do not explode on impact as designed – instead, they linger like landmines, endangering civilians for months or years to come.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions absolutely bans the production, transfer, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions, as well as assistance with any of those activities. It also requires States parties to destroy stockpiles, clear cluster munition remnants, and assist victims.

As of this May, the Convention has 111 States parties and an additional 12 signatories, and it has done much to achieve its goal of ending the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions. According to the Cluster Munition Monitor 2022 report, States parties have destroyed 99 percent their stockpiles, removing 1.5 million cluster munitions and 178 million submunitions from countries’ arsenals. While States parties could do more, they have cleared wide swaths of land and provided a range of aid to victims.

States parties have also complied with the prohibition on use, and the stigma generated by the Convention has pressured some States not party to the treaty to cease their use. The United States, for example, has not used the weapon since 2003, except for one isolated attack in Yemen.

No treaty is a panacea. Russia and Ukraine, neither of which is a party, have both used cluster munitions since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Their use has caused hundreds of casualties for Ukrainian civilians. But these attacks have generated international condemnation and NATO States have rejected Ukraine’s request for transfers of cluster munitions.

Autonomous Weapons Systems: Struggle for New Law

Meanwhile, countries have yet to agree to a comparable treaty on autonomous weapons systems even though 91 countries have called for a legally binding instrument. As with cluster munitions, there are concerns that autonomous weapons systems would be indiscriminate, in this case because they would lack the technology and human judgment to distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians or surrendering or wounded soldiers. Delegating life-and-death determinations to machines also raises a host of other ethical, legal, accountability, and security issues.

Six months after Heyns presented the issue to the Human Rights Council in 2013, the international debate shifted to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) because most countries wanted to deal with the issue through an international humanitarian law framework rather than an international human rights law body. Discussions in this forum allowed for countries to refine their policy positions, and convergence has emerged around a “two-tier” approach that would include both prohibitions and regulations on autonomous weapons systems.

Proponents use varied terminology, but the version espoused by many countries as well as Human Rights Watch and the Stop Killer Robots campaign calls for prohibiting autonomous weapons that select and engage targets without meaningful human control and adopting regulations to ensure that all other autonomous weapons systems can only operate with meaningful human control. Civil society organizations, along with the International Committee of the Red Cross and some countries, have also called for prohibiting weapons systems that target humans.

According to this view, meaningful human control requires that systems be understandable and predictable and constrained in the temporal and geographic scope of their operation.

Despite this widespread convergence, the CCW operates by consensus, which has prevented countries from agreeing to negotiate a legally binding instrument since a single country can delay and disrupt the process. Some countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, and others, prefer voluntary measures. Russia has repeatedly obstructed progress even at that level, seeking to weaken the annual mandate of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts that deals with the issue.

At the recent Experts meeting in Geneva in mid-May, States discussed ways to address what they refer to as “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS). On the last night, diplomats negotiated until past midnight trying to find compromise on a report of their conclusions, but the language became increasingly watered down. While the draft never included a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument, even though that is what most countries wanted, it reflected the convergence around a two-tiered approach and support for requiring elements like predictability and understandability in the use of force.

But by early morning, the only consensus States could reach was language like this weak excerpt from final report of the Group of Governmental Experts:

[T]he Group concluded that:

(a) IHL continues to apply fully to the potential development of LAWS;

Weapons systems based on emerging technology in the area of LAWS must not be used if they are incapable of being used in compliance with IHL.

In essence, it means that it is unlawful to use a weapon system that cannot be used lawfully – a true but rather obvious statement that could have been made before the meeting.

Form over Forum: Lessons from the Cluster Munitions Process

The inability to make progress under the CCW process indicates that it is time to seek another forum, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions offers lessons in that regard. In addition to being a successful humanitarian disarmament instrument, it was achieved through a process that serves as a useful model for autonomous weapons systems treaty negotiations.

Multilateral efforts to address the civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions also began in the CCW, and they were similarly stymied by consensus. In that case, countries pursued an independent process outside of the U.N., known as the Oslo Process, following the precedent of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty negotiations.

The Oslo Process had four key benefits, which address shortcomings of the CCW forum. While there are some subtle differences, these characteristics can also be true of the U.N. General Assembly, as shown by the negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The General Assembly is another possible forum for negotiating an autonomous weapons systems treaty.

First, the Oslo Process was open to everyone, but participants had to commit at the beginning to the same goal, in that case to prohibit cluster munitions and adopt certain remedial measures. That step led to more effective and efficient negotiations by ensuring that participating countries agreed on the underlying purpose from the start. Second, countries also agreed early on to a deadline of less than two years, which expedited the process.

Third, negotiating States were not bound by consensus because their rules of procedure allowed for voting. They still sought to achieve unanimity on all matters and, in the Oslo Process, they never needed to resort to a vote, but the option was there, which prevented the threat of a veto leading to the lowest common denominator.

Finally, the Oslo Process was inclusive, involving a range of countries, international organizations, civil society, and survivors. This characteristic contrasts with the emerging CCW trend, exemplified at the last meeting when Russia insisted that observers be removed from informal sessions over the objections of 21 countries that supported their participation and the principle of inclusion.

Ultimately, countries that are serious about addressing the threats posed by autonomous weapons systems should not let the forum for negotiations dictate the form of their response to those threats. They should not remain beholden to the current CCW process, which seems after 10 years to have run its course. Instead, they should hold firm to their commitment to pursue a treaty on autonomous weapons systems and choose a process that will allow them to achieve it.

On this 15th anniversary, proponents of an autonomous weapons systems treaty can look to the Convention on Cluster Munitions for guidance and motivation. It shows that an effective, efficient, and inclusive process can lead to life-saving results.

IMAGE: States parties to the Convention Conventional Weapons gathered at the United Nations in Geneva for talks on autonomous weapons systems from May 15-19, 2023. (Photo via the Stop Killer Robots Campaign)

The post Cluster Munition Convention Offers Roadmap for New Autonomous Weapons Treaty appeared first on Just Security.

An increasing number of countries, including Australia, China, India, Iran, Israel, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are investing heavily in the military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) and related technologies to develop air, land, and sea-based autonomous weapons systems. Weapons systems with autonomous functions are already being used in Ukraine and other conflicts.

The plethora of ethical, legal, moral, operational, proliferation, and security risks raised by autonomous weapons systems have been thoroughly explored over the past decade. Yet at diplomatic talks held since 2014, a handful of countries, especially India, Russia, and the United States, have consistently resisted growing calls to negotiate a new legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems. International humanitarian law and human rights law badly need an update as they were written for humans and not machines.

An Expression of Regional Solidarity  

Latin American and Caribbean Conference

The Belén Communiqué is the main outcome document of a regional conference on autonomous weapons that the government of Costa Rica and local non-governmental organization FUNPADEM held in San José between Feb. 23-24. The first regional inter-governmental meeting on this topic explored the social and humanitarian impacts of autonomous weapons systems, which would select and engage targets based on sensor processing rather than human inputs.

Government representatives from nearly every country in Latin America and the Caribbean attended the conference as did officials from 13 observer countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, Switzerland, and the United States. The United Nations disarmament chief, Izumi Nakamitsu, and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) president Mirjana Spoljaric Egger addressed the conference and reiterated their respective institutions’ firm desire for a legally binding treaty to address autonomous weapons systems.

The Stop Killer Robots campaign, co-founded by Human Rights Watch and now consisting of more than 200 non-governmental organizations in 70 countries, had a strong presence at the Costa Rica conference. In a presentation to the conference, Human Rights Watch’s Bonnie Docherty highlighted the negative social and humanitarian consequences of permitting machines to take human life on the battlefield or in policing, border control, and other circumstances. Docherty called on States to open negotiations on a new international treaty to prohibit and restrict autonomous weapons systems and cited a recent report from Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic about forums for doing so.

Communiqué’s Call for a New Treaty

The Belén Communiqué, which over 30 States adopted, highlights the dangers of autonomous weapons systems. It recognizes that “emerging technologies pose concrete challenges to international peace and security, and raise new questions about the role of humans in warfare.” It finds that “it is paramount to maintain meaningful human control to prevent further dehumanization of warfare, as well as to ensure individual accountability and state responsibility.”

The communiqué further calls for an ethical and legal solution. It recognizes the relevance of a breadth of legal sources including international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the United Nations Charter, and invokes the Martens Clause, a provision of international humanitarian law that appeals to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience. At the same time, it acknowledges the limits of existing law, stating in its preamble that “the international community is called to respond to these threats by developing and strengthening the international legal framework” (emphasis added).

Finally, the communiqué echoes the broad support that has been voiced for a legally binding instrument with prohibitions and regulations to address the host of grave concerns raised by removing human control from the use of force. The Stop Killer Robots campaign, the ICRC, and many States have said that such an international treaty should prohibit autonomous weapons systems that inherently lack meaningful human control and systems that target people. It should contain positive obligations, that is, affirmative requirements, to ensure meaningful human control in other weapons systems that have elements of autonomy.

Competing Statements

The Belén Communiqué is the third joint statement on this topic to be issued in a matter of weeks, and it is significantly stronger than its counterparts.

The United States unveiled a proposed political declaration on Feb. 16 that seeks to ensure responsible use of weapons systems that incorporate AI capabilities. The State Department describes the proposed U.S. declaration as “a series of non-legally binding guidelines describing best practices for responsible use of AI in a defense context.” It has not provided a timeline for when the declaration might be finalized or indicated who might endorse it.

The Netherlands issued a “call to action” on the same day at the close of a conference that it co-hosted with South Korea in The Hague on “responsible use of AI in the military domain.” The call recognizes that “failure to adopt AI in a timely manner may result in a military disadvantage, while premature adoption without sufficient research, testing and assurance may result in inadvertent harm.” The Netherlands has published a list of 57 countries that it says have endorsed the call.

The recent Dutch and U.S. initiatives, however, fail to address the need to regulate autonomy in weapons systems through the adoption of new international law. They starkly contrast with the Belén Communiqué, which affirms the need for countries to “collaborate to promote the urgent negotiation of an international legally binding instrument, with prohibitions and regulations with regard to autonomy in weapons systems.” The Stop Killer Robots campaign has welcomed the Belén Communiqué for demonstrating “genuine political leadership in showing a way forward” toward the goal of new international law.

The Dutch and U.S. statements accept continued development and acquisition of autonomous weapons systems so long as doing so complies with existing law, processes, and ethical principles. The campaign has criticized both proposals for offering “vague and incoherent visions on the responsible use of military AI, without clarity on the rules or limitations needed on development and use.” Instead of creating adequate controls on the development of autonomous weapons, the Dutch and U.S. initiatives could facilitate even greater investments in these weapons.

The Way Ahead

Autonomous weapons systems present a grave problem that can affect any country in the world, so clear, strong, and global rules are important and urgent. To protect humanity, countries should support the negotiation of new international law to prohibit and restrict autonomous weapons systems.

Voluntary measures, such as codes of conduct, interpretations of how existing law applies, and non-binding principles, may be appealing to countries that oppose negotiating new law yet want to appear as though they are “doing something.” But they only pave the way for a more uncertain and dangerous future that involves automated killing.

The challenge now is how to achieve new international law. Particularly since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, diplomatic talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems under the auspices of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) have become deadlocked. The last substantive agreement by countries participating in the CCW meetings was the adoption of guiding principles for discussions in 2019. The CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts has provided a convenient talk shop, but it has shown repeatedly that it is incapable of producing a credible outcome.

The main reason for the lack of progress under the CCW is that its member countries rely on a consensus approach to decision-making, which means a single country can reject a proposal, even if every other country agrees to it. A handful of major military powers, notably Russia, have repeatedly blocked proposals to move to negotiations since 2021.

To make progress an alternative forum must be found. It is time to step outside the CCW to another forum that can aim higher, move faster, and be more inclusive of countries that are not part of the CCW as well as of civil society. One option is to undertake an independent process outside of U.N. auspices, as was used for the treaties banning antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. Another is a process initiated through the U.N. General Assembly, which is how the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was achieved. These precedents show how – with political will and voting-based decision-making – like-minded States can negotiate and adopt strong treaties in 15 months or less.

While the Belén Communiqué does not specify where negotiations of a treaty should take place, it recognizes the need to address the issue not only under the CCW but also in “other multilateral fora.” Furthermore, some States at the conference, such as Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, welcomed the possibility of action in various venues, notably the U.N. General Assembly or the Human Rights Council.

At the beginning of this year, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres warned that “technology is not moving incrementally” and neither should efforts to regulate and prevent harm. He again called for internationally agreed limits on lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Technology is indeed advancing rapidly, and autonomy is playing an increasing role in the use of force. After a decade of debate, it is urgent to start drafting new legally binding rules to prevent the automation of killing.

IMAGE: Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Nations Maritza Chan and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Christian Guillermet-Fernandez present newly adopted Belén Communiqué.

The post Latin America and Caribbean Nations Rally Against Autonomous Weapons Systems appeared first on Just Security.

The political declaration, which 82 countries signed at a ceremony in Dublin Castle on Nov. 18, goes beyond calling for better compliance with existing international humanitarian law by committing the endorsing countries to take additional measures to prevent and remediate the devastating humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The success of the endorsement conference warrants celebration, but it also marks the beginning of a new phase of work. Governments, international organizations, and civil society groups now need to focus on universalizing, interpreting, and implementing the document.

A New Political Declaration to Protect Civilians

While not legally binding, the declaration is a milestone for efforts to advance humanitarian disarmament and curb human suffering during armed conflict. It sets international standards for restricting the use of explosive weapons. It demands military training and changes in national policies and practices that have the potential to reduce the harm from a method of war that causes direct and indirect, or reverberating, effects. It also includes commitments on victim assistance, data collection and sharing, and follow-up meetings.

The declaration is the product of a three-year process led by Ireland. Its signatories come from every region of the world and include countries affected by armed conflict and major military powers. Six of the world’s top eight arms exporters — the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and South Korea — have joined, as well as 24 of 30 NATO Member States.

Ukraine expressed its support at the conference for the declaration’s spirit and principles, but said that it would only be able to endorse the instrument after its conflict with Russia ended and it regained sovereignty over its territory.

The Cost of Explosive Weapons

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has high costs for civilians both at the time of attack and long after. The weapons’ blast and fragmentation cause widespread civilian casualties and inflict psychological trauma. According to Action on Armed Violence, when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, an average of 90 percent of those killed or injured are civilians.

Damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure, including power, water, and sanitation facilities, interferes with basic services, such as health care and education, even long after the conflict ends. The lack of services in turn infringes on human rights, such as the right to education or to quality, available, and accessible health care.

The use of explosive weapons also causes harm to the environment. Bombing and shelling of industrial facilities, for example, releases toxins into the air or water sources. Explosive ordnance lingers long after conflict. The threat of immediate death and injury as well as the reverberating effects discussed above drive mass displacement.

All of these consequences are exacerbated when the explosive weapons have wide area effects, that is, when their impacts cover a broad footprint. Explosive weapons have such effects if they have a wide blast or fragmentation radius, are inaccurate, or deliver multiple munitions at once. The political declaration recognizes these factors as increasing the risk of “a devastating impact on civilians and civilian objects” (paragraph 1.2).

Human Rights Watch and other groups have documented the direct and indirect effects of explosive weapons in recent armed conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

A New Challenge Ahead: Implementing the Declaration

As countries translate the declaration’s words into actions, they should stay true to the declaration’s goal of strengthening civilian protection. Safeguarding Civilians, a recent report co-published by Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, for which I work, examines several of the declaration’s key commitments and interprets them through a humanitarian lens. Some of its findings are presented below.

The core, and most debated, provision of the declaration calls on countries to adopt “policies and practices to help avoid civilian harm, including by restricting or refraining as appropriate from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects” (paragraph 3.3). We, and others, argue it is “appropriate” for countries to “refrain from” the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, given that the harm of such weapons can always be expected. Countries should then “restrict” the use of all other explosive weapons in populated areas.

In addition, under paragraph 3.4, countries should take into account the direct and indirect effects of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas when planning and executing attacks because these effects meet the declaration’s threshold of being reasonably foreseeable.

Remediating the humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons demands comprehensive victim assistance measures, another key element of the declaration (paragraph 4.5). Assistance should be provided to affected individuals, families, and communities and take a variety of forms. It should be integrated, inclusive, and gender sensitive.

Data collection and sharing are essential to both preventing and remediating the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. An accurate and in-depth understanding of effects can inform lessons learned, help identify the kinds of victim assistance needed, facilitate international cooperation and assistance, and promote monitoring and compliance.

Countries should make clear that they will collect and share operational data about weapons and targets as well as information about the range of effects of explosive weapons. Both are necessary to achieve the declaration’s goals. While the declaration says data should be collected and shared “where feasible and appropriate” (paragraph 4.2), rather than use that caveat as an excuse to avoid transparency, countries should work to ensure that data collection and sharing are feasible and presume they are appropriate unless they risk further harm.

Finally, countries should live up to their commitment to engage in follow-up work on the declaration, including through regular meetings (paragraph 4.7). Those meetings are essential opportunities to exchange views on policies, practices, and interpretations of the declaration, provide updates on progress, share collected data, and promote implementation. Maintaining the inclusiveness that has characterized this process to date will add value to the discussions.

At the Dublin conference, Norway announced that it will host the declaration’s next meeting in 2024. That date may seem far way, but the declaration’s first major test will be how much can be accomplished by then to carry out its provisions. While addressing the humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is a challenging process, countries that signed the declaration should strive to realize their commitments effectively and efficiently with that date — and especially civilian lives — in mind.  

IMAGE: Nujeen Mustafa, a Syrian disability and refugee rights activist who fled bombing in Aleppo, placed flowers on a Memorial to the Unknown Civilian before the endorsement of the new political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in Dublin, Ireland, on Nov. 18, 2022. (Photo by International Network on Explosive Weapons)

The post Over 80 Countries Committed to Curb Use of Explosive Weapons, Now Comes the Hard Part appeared first on Just Security.

У нинішньому збройному конфлікті в Україні російські війська в значній мірі покладаються на два види зброї, які відомі своєю неприйнятною і часто незаконною шкодою, яку вони завдають цивільному населенню. Це касетні боєприпаси, які були заборонені більшістю країн світу, і вибухова зброя з широким радіусом дії, яка при використанні в населених пунктах є однією з основних причин жертв серед цивільного населення в сучасних збройних конфліктах.

Внаслідок використанням цієї зброї було вбито та поранено сотні мирних жителів, будівлі перетворились на руїни та відбулось масове переміщення людей. Судячи з досвіду минулих конфліктів, вона, швидше за все, також залишить Україні спадок шкоди, яка зберігається ще довго після завершення активних бойових дій.

Касетні боєприпаси

Касетні боєприпаси – велика зброя, яка містить десятки або сотні менших боєприпасів, які називаються суббоєприпасами – загрожують цивільному населенню з двох причин. По-перше, вони мають широкий радіус дії, оскільки вони розкидають свої суббоєприпаси на широкій площі, зазвичай розміром з футбольне поле. Ці суббоєприпаси не можуть відрізнити солдат від цивільних при використанні в населених пунктах. По-друге, багато їх суббоєприпасів не вибухають при ударі, стаючи де-факто наземними мінами, які становлять загрозу для цивільного населення протягом місяців, років або навіть десятиліть після конфлікту. Ці так звані «підривні міни» часто підривають діти, які думають, що це іграшки, фермери, які б’ють їх плугами, або біженці, які повертаються додому.

Безпосередня шкода, завдана касетними боєприпасами, вже стала очевидною в Україні. Human Rights Watch (де я є старшою науковою співробітницею) задокументувала удар російських військ біля лікарні у Вугледарі в підконтрольній Україні Донецькій області 24 лютого. Балістична ракета «Точка» серії 9М79 доставила боєголовку касетного боєприпаса 9Н123, яка містила 50 суббоєприпасів. В результаті нападу загинули четверо мирних жителів і ще 10 отримали поранення, в тому числі шість медичних працівників. Вона пошкодила будівлю лікарні, машину швидкої допомоги та цивільні автомобілі.

Через чотири дні, 28 лютого, російські війська запустили ракети з касетними боєприпасами 9М55К «Смерч» по трьох районах Харкова, як з’ясувала Human Rights Watch. Кожна з цих ракет, які часто запускаються залпами по 12 штук, несе 72 суббоєприпаси 9N235. Організація Об’єднаних Націй повідомила про дев’ять загиблих цивільних та 37 поранених у результаті обстрілу по всьому місту того дня.

Згідно з останніми дослідженнями Human Rights Watch, російські війська обстріляли Миколаїв касетними боєприпасами «Смерч» та «Ураган» 7, 11 і 13 березня. За повідомленнями, лише за останній день було вбито дев’ять мирних жителів у черзі біля банкомата. Інші організації та журналісти також повідомляли про обстріли касетними боєприпасами в Україні.

Правило розрізнення у міжнародному гуманітарному праві (МГП) вимагає від сторін конфлікту розрізняти цивільних осіб і комбатантів, а також цивільні об’єкти і військові цілі. Використання касетних боєприпасів принаймні там, де можуть бути цивільні, порушує це правило. Human Rights Watch та інші стверджують, що вони за своєю суттю є невибірковими. Під час обстрілу широкий радіус дії цієї зброї не дозволяє їм розрізняти комбатантів і некомбатантів. Крім того, нерозірвані суббоєприпаси, які вони залишають, роблять їх невибірковими, оскільки їх дію не можна обмежити. Обстріли із застосуванням касетних боєприпасів у населених пунктах також можуть порушувати принцип пропорційності, який забороняє атаки, під час яких очікувана шкода цивільному населенню або пошкодження цивільних об’єктів є надмірною порівняно з очікуваною військовою перевагою.

Люди, які віддають наказ здійснювати або здійснюють атаки з касетними боєприпасами проти цивільного населення або цивільних об’єктів зі злочинним наміром, тобто навмисно чи необережно, несуть відповідальність за воєнні злочини.

Через неприйнятну шкоду, яку завдають касетні боєприпаси та їх невибірковий характер, Конвенція про касетні боєприпаси 2008 року забороняє їх використання, виробництво, передачу та накопичення. Хоча Росія та Україна не приєдналися до договору, 110 країн є його сторонами, включаючи більшість країн НАТО (хоча не Сполучені Штати).

Конвенція також зобов’язує кожну державу-учасницю «просувати встановлені нею норми та… докладати всіх зусиль, щоб стримувати держави, які не є учасницями цієї Конвенції, від використання касетних боєприпасів». Відповідно до цього положення щонайменше 15 держав-учасниць засудили або висловили занепокоєння щодо використання Росією касетних боєприпасів в Україні.

Президент Конвенції про касетні боєприпаси, яким зараз є Великобританія, разом із Генеральним секретарем НАТО, Верховним комісаром ООН з прав людини та Європейським Союзом, також засудили використання касетних боєприпасів в Україні.

Вибухова зброя в населених пунктах

Хоча касетні боєприпаси особливо жахливі для цивільного населення, вони є лише одним із видів вибухової зброї. Більш широка категорія вибухової зброї, яка включає артилерійські снаряди, мінометні снаряди, ракети, посилену вибухову (або термобаричну) зброю та авіабомби, серед іншого, завдала основну частину шкоди, пов’язаної із конфліктом, в Україні.

Використання вибухової зброї в населених пунктах має серйозні гуманітарні наслідки як під час, так і після нападів. Ці наслідки збільшуються, коли зброя має широкий спектр дії, оскільки: вона має великий радіус вибуху або осколків; вона неточна; вона доставляє декілька боєприпасів одночасно (наприклад, касетні боєприпаси); або є комбінацією вищевказаного.

Російські бомбардування та обстріли українських міст та селищ завдали фізичної та психологічної шкоди мирному населенню. За даними Human Rights Watch, за перші 11 днів конфлікту внаслідок артилерійських обстрілів і авіаударів Росії в Харкові загинули або отримали поранення понад 450 мирних жителів. Атаки також зруйнували будинки, багатоквартирні будинки та інші, насамперед, цивільні споруди та інфраструктуру, а також завдали шкоди навколишньому середовищу.

Однак ціна цього методу війни не обмежується прямими наслідками. Використання вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії у населених пунктах також викликає непрямі та віддалені (ревербераційні) наслідки. Знищення інфраструктури може порушити роботу життєзабезпечувальних служб і, у свою чергу, порушити цілу низку прав людини.

У 2016 році я була співавторкою детальної доповіді про наслідки використання вибухової зброї для сфери охорони здоров’я під час попереднього конфлікту на сході України, яку опублікували Міжнародна клініка з прав людини Гарвардської юридичної школи (де я викладаю) та PAX. Ми виявили, наприклад, що пошкодження електростанцій та ліній зв’язку серйозно вплинуло на лікарні та надання медичної допомоги, а отже, порушило право на здоров’я. Такі віддалені наслідки майже напевно будуть більш серйозними в нинішньому – набагато більшому – конфлікті.

Використання вибухової зброї в населених пунктах також посилює переміщення людей. За даними Агентства ООН у справах біженців (UNHCR), станом на 18 березня понад три мільйони людей втекли з України внаслідок конфлікту. Напади на міські центри, які супроводжуються використанням вибухової зброї, є одним із рушійних факторів.

У заяві до Ради Безпеки ООН представник Управління ООН з координації гуманітарних питань (OCHA) зазначив, що багато з цих наслідків були відчутними вже до 28 лютого. «Як ми і боялися, цивільні вже платять ціну», – сказав він. «Масштаби жертв серед цивільного населення та пошкодження цивільної інфраструктури навіть у ці перші дні викликають тривогу».

Чітко наголошуючи на небезпеці застосування вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії, він продовжив: «Цивільне населення незаслужено постраждає від цих нападів на густонаселені міські центри. . . . І чим довше це буде тривати, тим більшою буде ціна для цивільних».

Очікується, що використання вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії у населених пунктах призведе до невибіркових атак із великими втратами серед цивільного населення. Характер шкоди цивільному населенню, яку завдає ця зброя, включаючи її віддалені (ревербераційні) наслідки, добре задокументовані і посилюють занепокоєння, що напади також будуть непропорційними. Крім того, використання вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії у населених пунктах, як правило, суперечить обов’язку згідно з МГП вживати всіх можливих запобіжних заходів для мінімізації шкоди цивільному населенню. Особи, відповідальні за незаконне використання вибухової зброї зі злочинним умислом, вчиняють воєнні злочини.

Хоча вибухова зброя, на відміну від касетних боєприпасів зокрема, не заборонена жодним міжнародно-правовим документом, країни працюють над політичною декларацією, яка адресує гуманітарні наслідки її використання в населених пунктах. Наступний раунд переговорів щодо цього процесу під керівництвом Ірландії, який був відкладений через пандемію Covid-19, тепер запланований на 6-8 квітня.

Події в Україні підкреслюють, наскільки важливо для країн включити в декларацію зобов’язання уникати використання цієї зброї в населених пунктах. Це політичне зобов’язання, незважаючи на відсутність обов’язкового характеру, встановить важливі стандарти для боротьби зі смертельною практикою сучасної війни.

Занепокоєння щодо використання Росією вибухової зброї в міських центрах України з боку таких країн, як Австрія та Ірландія, і як зазначено в резолюції Ради ООН з прав людини від 4 березня, свідчить про зростання підтримки цих стандартів.

Припинити і засудити

Жахливі зображення та розповіді, які надходять з України, дають змогу побачити безпосередню шкоду, яку російські касетні боєприпаси та вибухова зброя завдають цивільному населенню України. Документація впливу цієї зброї в минулих конфліктах дає підстави вважати, що шкода буде довгостроковою.

Щоб запобігти розвитку гуманітарної кризи, Росія повинна негайно припинити використання касетних боєприпасів і уникати використання вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії у населених пунктах. Інші країни та Організація Об’єднаних Націй повинні підтримувати зусилля щодо документування таких випадків для забезпечення внутрішньої та міжнародної відповідальності за будь-які порушення МГП та міжнародного права з прав людини, і зокрема підтримувати розслідування в Україні Міжнародного кримінального суду.

Інші держави та Організація Об’єднаних Націй також повинні чітко засудити використання касетних боєприпасів і вибухової зброї з широким радіусом дії у населених пунктах. Така цілеспрямована критика не лише посилить тиск на Росію, щоб вона змінила свою практику в Україні, вона також посилить міжнародні норми проти таких засобів і методів війни.

Це сприятиме цілям Конвенції про касетні боєприпаси, посилюючи її вплив серед країн, які ще не приєдналися; заохочуватиме прийняття жорсткої політичної декларації щодо вибухової зброї в населених пунктах; і тим самим сприятиме покращенню захисту цивільного населення в майбутніх конфліктах.

Фото: Прапор Міжнародного Червоного Хреста майорить, коли біженці, які тікають з України, прибувають до прикордонного пункту Вишне Немецке 13 березня 2022 року у Вишне Немецке, Словаччина. Понад два мільйони людей втекли з України в сусідні країни відтоді, як Росія почала повномасштабне вторгнення в країну 24 лютого. (Фото Christopher Furlong/Getty Images)

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Про авторку:

Бонні Дочерті є старшою дослідницею з питань озброєнь в Human Rights Watch і заступницею директора з питань збройних конфліктів і захисту цивільного населення Міжнародної клініки з прав людини Гарвардської юридичної школи.

The post Використання Росією касетних боєприпасів та іншої вибухової зброї свідчить про необхідність посилення захисту цивільного населення appeared first on Just Security.

In the current armed conflict in Ukraine, Russian forces have relied heavily on two types of weapons that are notorious for the unacceptable and often unlawful harm they inflict on civilians. The weapons are cluster munitions, which have been banned by most countries in the world, and explosive weapons with wide area effects, which when used in populated areas are among the major causes of civilian casualties in contemporary armed conflict.

Attacks with these weapons have already killed and injured hundreds of civilians, turned buildings into rubble, and led to mass displacement. Judging by the experience of past conflicts, they will most likely also leave Ukraine with a legacy of harm that lingers long after active hostilities end.

Cluster Munitions

Cluster munitions, large weapons that contain dozens or hundreds of smaller weapons called submunitions, endanger civilians for two reasons. First, they have a wide area effect because they spread their submunitions over a broad footprint, commonly the size of a football field.  These submunitions cannot distinguish soldiers from civilians when used in populated areas. Second, many of their submunitions do not explode on impact, becoming de facto landmines that pose threats to civilians for months, years, or even decades after a conflict. These so-called “duds” are frequently detonated by children who think they are toys, farmers who hit them with their plows, or refugees who return home.

The immediate harm caused by cluster munitions has already been evident in Ukraine. Human Rights Watch (where I am a senior researcher) documented a strike by Russian forces near a hospital in Vuhledar in the Ukraine-controlled Donetska region on Feb. 24. A 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile delivered a 9N123 cluster munition warhead, containing 50 submunitions. The attack killed four civilians and injured another 10, including six healthcare workers. It damaged a hospital building, an ambulance, and civilian vehicles.

Four days later, on Feb. 28, Russian forces launched 9M55K Smerch cluster munition rockets in three neighborhoods of Kharkiv, Human Rights Watch found. Each of these rockets, which are often fired in volleys of 12, carries 72 9N235 submunitions. The United Nations reported nine civilian deaths and 37 injuries in attacks across the city that day.

Russian forces launched Smerch and Uragan cluster munitions into the city of Mykolaiv on Mar. 7, 11, and 13, reportedly killing nine civilians in line at a cash machine on the last day alone, according to more recent Human Rights Watch research. Other organizations and journalists have also reported cluster munition attacks in Ukraine.

International humanitarian law (IHL)’s rule of distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. The use of cluster munitions, at least where civilians may be present, violates this rule. Human Rights Watch and others argue they are inherently indiscriminate. At the time of attack, the wide-area effect of these weapons prevents them from distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. In addition, the unexploded submunitions they leave behind makes them indiscriminate because their effects cannot be limited. Attacks using cluster munitions in populated areas may also violate the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks in which expected injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects is excessive in relation to anticipated military advantage.

The people who order or carry out cluster munitions attacks against civilians or civilian objects with criminal intent—that is, willfully or recklessly—are responsible for war crimes.

Due to the unacceptable harm cluster munitions cause and their indiscriminate nature, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions bans their use, production, transfer, and stockpiling. Although Russia and Ukraine have not joined the treaty, 110 countries are party, including most NATO countries (although not the United States).

The convention also obligates each state party to “promote the norms it establishes and … make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.” In compliance with this provision, at least 15 states parties have condemned or expressed concern about Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.

The president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which is currently the United Kingdom, along with the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Union have also condemned the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.

Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

While cluster munitions are especially horrific for civilians, they are just one type of explosive weapon. The broader category of explosive weapons, which encompasses artillery shells, mortar rounds, rockets, missiles, enhanced blast (aka thermobaric) weapons, and aerial bombs, among others, has caused the bulk of the conflict-related damage in Ukraine.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has grave humanitarian consequences both during and after attacks. Those effects are magnified when the weapons have wide area effects because: they have a large blast or fragmentation radius; they are inaccurate; they deliver multiple munitions at once (e.g., cluster munitions); or they have a combination of the above.

Russia’s bombing and shelling of Ukraine’s cities and towns has taken a physical and psychological toll on the civilian population. According to Human Rights Watch, Russian artillery shelling and airstrikes killed or injured  more than 450 civilians in the city of Kharkiv in the first 11 days of the conflict. The attacks have also leveled homes, apartment buildings, and other primarily civilian structures and infrastructure, and damaged the environment.

The costs of this method of war, however, extend beyond its direct effects. The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas also causes indirect and reverberating effects. The destruction of infrastructure can interfere with essential services and in turn infringe on an array of human rights.

In 2016, I co-authored an in-depth report on the effects of explosive weapons’ use on health care in the earlier conflict in eastern Ukraine, which was published by Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (where I teach) and PAX. We found, for example, that damage to power plants and communication lines seriously affected hospitals and the provision of health care, and thus undermined the right to health. Such reverberating impacts will almost certainly be more severe in the current – much larger – conflict.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas also exacerbates displacement. As of Mar. 18, more than three million people had fled Ukraine as a result of the conflict, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). The attacks on urban centers with explosive weapons are one of the driving factors.

In a statement to the UN Security Council, a representative from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that many of these effects were already being felt by Feb. 28. “As we all feared, civilians are already paying the price,” he said. “The scale of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, even in these very early days, is alarming.”

Explicitly highlighting the dangers of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, he continued, “Civilians will undeservedly suffer the most from these attacks on densely populated urban centres. . . .  And the longer this goes on, the greater the cost will be for civilians.”

Using  explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas can be expected to result in indiscriminate attacks with a high loss of civilian life. The patterns of harm to civilians that these weapons cause, including their reverberating effects, are well documented and heighten concerns that attacks will also be disproportionate. In addition, the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas is generally counter to the IHL duty to take all feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm. Those who are responsible for using explosive weapons unlawfully with criminal intent are committing war crimes.

While explosive weapons, unlike cluster munitions in particular, are not banned by any instrument of international law, countries have been working toward a political declaration that addresses the humanitarian consequences of their use in populated areas. The next round of negotiations of this Ireland-led process, which had been postponed by the Covid-19 pandemic, are now scheduled for April 6-8.

The events in Ukraine underscore how important it is for countries to include in the declaration a commitment to avoid the use of these weapons in populated areas. This political commitment, although non-binding, would set important standards for dealing with a deadly practice of modern war.

The concern regarding Russia’s use of explosive weapons in Ukraine’s urban centers from countries including Austria and Ireland, and as stated in the UN Human Rights Council resolution of Mar. 4, demonstrates the growing support for these standards.

Cease and Condemn

The horrific images and accounts emerging from Ukraine offer a glimpse of the immediate harm that Russian cluster munitions and explosive weapons are inflicting on Ukraine’s civilians. Documentation of the effects of these weapons in past conflicts suggest the harm will be long term.

To prevent furthering the humanitarian crisis, Russia should immediately cease the use of cluster munitions and avoid using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. Other countries and the United Nations should support documentation efforts to ensure domestic and international accountability for any violations of IHL and international human right law and in particular support the International Criminal Court’s Ukraine investigation.

Other states and the United Nations should also explicitly condemn the use of cluster munitions and explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas. Such focused criticism will not only increase pressure on Russia to change its practices in Ukraine. It will also strengthen the international norms against these means and methods of war.

It will bolster the Convention on Cluster Munitions, increasing its influence among countries that have not already joined; encourage the adoption a robust political declaration on explosive weapons in populated areas; and in so doing, help improve protections for civilians in future conflicts.

IMAGE: The flag of the International Red Cross flies as refugees fleeing Ukraine arrive at the Vysne Nemecke border crossing on March 13, 2022 in Vysne Nemecke, Slovakia. More than two million people have fled Ukraine into neighbouring countries since Russia launched a large-scale invasion of the country on February 24. (Photo by Christopher Furlong/Getty Images)

The post Russia’s Use of Cluster Munitions and Other Explosive Weapons Shows Need for Stronger Civilian Protections appeared first on Just Security.

Under the US Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), troops are allowed to fire in self-defense if they encounter someone demonstrating hostile intent, i.e., the “threat of imminent use of force.” Identifying such a threat presents challenges, however, especially when enemy forces blend in with the local population. Mistaken determinations of hostile intent were a major cause of civilian casualties attributable to the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2014. Tackling Tough Calls, a new report by the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, examines this problem. Drawing on interviews with combat veterans and current servicemembers as well as open source research, it shows how the US military could better protect civilians from such errors without jeopardizing the lives of its troops.

Civilian casualty data from Afghanistan illuminates the significant danger that hostile intent incidents pose to civilians. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), between 2008 and 2013, about 70 percent of civilian deaths from “pro-government forces,” including US and other international forces, were attributable to three types of operations: escalation of force (EOF) procedures, used primarily at checkpoints; search and seizure operations, especially night raids; and airstrikes, most notably unplanned “opportunity” strikes. All three frequently involve hostile intent determinations. A 2013 Defense Department study similarly found that mistaking civilians for the enemy, which commonly resulted from misperceptions of hostile intent, “was the primary cause” of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Although the official “combat missions” in Afghanistan and Iraq have ended, the US military’s experiences there should inform its future operations and training of foreign forces. By focusing specifically on hostile intent, it could augment the civilian protection measures adopted during those recent conflicts.

The US military should begin by rectifying shortcomings in the rule of hostile intent, which permits troops to fire if they face an “imminent” threat. The latest SROE, which date to 2005, define “imminent” as “not necessarily … immediate or instantaneous.” This negative definition creates a vague standard that forces troops to rely on subjective decision making. The current definition of imminent is also excessively broad. It contrasts notably with NATO’s definition — “manifest, instant and overwhelming” — which is closer to the common understanding of the term. A clearer and narrower rule could reduce the risk that a civilian’s behavior is misconstrued as hostile.

The military should supplement such revisions to the SROE by providing troops with the means to interpret them. In Afghanistan, US commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) issued tactical directives that decreased civilian casualties from EOF procedures, night raids, and airstrikes. These directives had positive humanitarian effects and advanced ISAF’s efforts to build support among the Afghan people for its counterinsurgency mission. They could serve as models for detailed guidelines that deal explicitly with hostile intent. Unlike tactical directives, which are conflict specific, however, these guidelines would have to be applicable across conflicts.

In practice, the US military should maximize use of three existing tools in implementing the rule of hostile intent: training, leadership, and local engagement. Veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq, ranging from specialists to generals, emphasized the need for improved training in this area. While pre-deployment training has grown more realistic over the past decade, interviewees said that training could better reflect the complexities of hostile intent situations on the ground. For example, a sergeant described being surprised when he arrived in Iraq by the number of unofficial checkpoints set up by armed men without uniforms. The men appeared hostile to him, and he only figured out that they were a common and accepted presence in the region because his comrades seemed unconcerned.

Leadership is another important tool for improving hostile intent determinations. Field leaders help troops understand the rules of engagement and apply them in specific circumstances. They also set a tone for how the rules should be interpreted. Discussing the power superiors have to influence their subordinates’ actions, a former UNAMA official recalled encountering one US field commander who insisted his unit conduct “proper warfare,” i.e., aggressive operations, and another who was willing to risk an IED explosion in order to avoid killing civilians. The US military should ensure that all leaders have a strong grasp on the rule of hostile intent and provide their troops with clear and consistent guidance on how to implement it.

Engagement with the local population, through cultural training before deployment and relationship building on the ground, can further increase the accuracy of hostile intent determinations. One Special Forces officer encouraged the military to focus on teaching troops about local behavior, not just social mores. An Iraq veteran said he was taught to look for “strange objects by the road,” but found the lesson to be oversimplified and unhelpful because “Iraq is full of strange objects.” When he observed a child carrying trash across a highway in Iraq, he was struck that what proved to be an ordinary and harmless activity would have signaled an IED planting during training scenarios. If troops are aware of what is normal in their operational environment, they can better identify when an individual’s intentions are hostile.

Finally, in addition to taking steps to prevent incorrect determinations of hostile intent, the military should seek to learn lessons from any mistakes that do occur. It could, for example, institutionalize a civilian casualty tracking cell, akin to what ISAF used in Afghanistan, to gather and analyze casualty data. Whatever mechanism the military develops should incorporate qualitative as well as quantitative analysis of hostile intent incidents. Its focus would not be to prosecute troops who honestly believed their lives were at risk. Rather it would strive to identify the reasons for erroneous decisions in order to minimize them in the future.

Tackling Tough Calls recognizes the challenges of accurately determining hostile intent and the right of troops to self-defense, while underscoring the moral, legal, and strategic imperative of civilian protection. If the US military revised the rule of hostile intent, took full advantage of the available tools to implement it, and adopted effective mechanisms to learn from its mistakes, it could save civilian lives without unduly endangering military ones.

This post and the report it discusses are written solely in the author’s Harvard Law School capacity.

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Representatives from 87 countries gathered at the United Nations in Geneva last week to discuss concerns about this technology and possible ways to respond. The conference was the first multilateral meeting dedicated to lethal autonomous weapons systems. It represented a crucial step in a process that should result in a ban on these problematic weapons before it grows too late to change course.

Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic are calling for a pre-emptive prohibition on the development, production, and use of these weapons. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a global coalition of 51 nongovernmental organizations coordinated by Human Rights Watch, is making the same call.

Overall, the talks in Geneva were productive and positive. The conference, under the auspices of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), attracted hundreds of delegates from governments, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental groups, setting a record for a CCW meeting. Participants engaged in four days of substantive discussions about the technical, ethical, legal, and operational concerns raised by fully autonomous weapons.

This “informal meeting of experts” was also noteworthy for its timeliness, unusual for a CCW conference. This meeting took place just a year and a half after Human Rights Watch and the Harvard clinic issued a groundbreaking report on these weapons, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, which the UN website credited with bringing the issue to “the international community’s attention.”

The meeting illuminated both areas of emerging agreement and ongoing points of contention. At their next meeting in November, states parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons should show that they are serious about taking action to deal with fully autonomous weapons and adopt a mandate for even deeper discussions in 2015.

Areas of Emerging Agreement

Four promising themes emerged at the recent meeting. First, there was widespread support for continuing discussions. The countries made clear that they saw last week as merely an initial foray into the issue. Many delegates also explicitly recognized the importance of continuing to involve nongovernmental groups, including the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and its member organizations.

Second, a significant number of countries expressed particular concern about the ethical problems raised by fully autonomous weapons. The chair’s final report noted that these countries “stressed the fact that the possibility for a robotic system to acquire capacities of ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘judgment’ was highly questionable.” Furthermore, these machines could not understand and respect the value of life, yet they would be given the power to determine when to take it away. Fully autonomous weapons would thus threaten to undermine human dignity.

Third, many countries emphasized that weapons systems should always fall under “meaningful human control.” While the parameters of this concept will require careful definition, obligating nations to maintain that control is vital to averting a watershed in the nature of warfare that could endanger civilians and soldiers alike.

Finally, countries frequently noted in their statements the relevance of international human rights law as well as international humanitarian law. Human rights law applies in peace and war, and it would govern the use of these weapons not only on the battlefield but also in law enforcement operations. In a new report released last week, Shaking the Foundations: The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots, Human Rights Watch and the Harvard clinic found that fully autonomous weapons could contravene the rights to life and a remedy as well as the principle of dignity.

Legal Debate

The most contentious part of the discussion surrounded the application of international humanitarian law to fully autonomous weapons. The debate echoed many of the points raised in a second paper that Human Rights Watch and the Harvard clinic released at the meeting. “Advancing the Debate on Killer Robots” responds directly to 12 critiques of a ban on the weapons.

The meeting revealed a divergence of views about the adequacy of international humanitarian law to deal with fully autonomous weapons. Critics of a ban argue that problematic use of these weapons would violate existing law and that supplementary law is unnecessary. A new treaty banning the weapons, however, would bring clarity, minimizing the need for case-by-case determinations of lawfulness and facilitating enforcement. It would also increase the stigma against the weapon, which can influence even states not party to a treaty to abide by a ban. In addition, a treaty dedicated to fully autonomous weapons could address proliferation, unlike traditional international humanitarian law, which focuses on use.

The debate about the adequacy of international humanitarian law to deal with fully autonomous weapons is reminiscent of arguments made in earlier Convention on Conventional Weapons meetings about cluster munitions. The adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions by 107 states resolved that dispute. Prohibitions on five other weapons that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm—antipersonnel landmines, blinding lasers, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and poison gas— provide additional precedent for new law. While most states are reserving judgment on the best solution to deal with the problems posed by fully autonomous weapons, five countries called for a ban last week.

Participants in the last week’s meeting also disagreed about when action should be taken. Critics of a ban supported a wait-and-see approach, arguing that improvements in technology could address the obstacles to compliance with international humanitarian law. There are serious doubts, however, that robots could ever replicate certain complex human qualities, such as judgment, necessary to comply with principles of distinction and proportionality. Furthermore, grave ethical concerns, the likelihood of proliferation and a robotic arms race, an accountability gap, and the prospect of premature deployment all suggest a technological fix would not suffice to address the weapons’ problems.

Action should be taken now before countries invest more in the technology and become less willing to give it up. The pre-emptive ban on blinding lasers in Protocol IV to the Convention on Conventional Weapons can serve as a useful model.

Next Steps

Despite some points of disagreement, the meeting advanced efforts to deal with fully autonomous weapons. Nations need to keep up momentum, however, to avoid having such meetings become what some have called a “talk shop.” In the short term, individual countries should establish national moratoria on fully autonomous weapons.

In November, the parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons should adopt a mandate to study the issue in greater depth in 2015. They should agree to hold three to four weeks of formal meetings, known as a Group of Governmental Experts. They should also be clear that the meetings would be a step toward negotiating a new protocol on fully autonomous weapons. Such intense discussions would move the debate forward. They would show that the treaty members are committed to addressing this issue and that the Convention on Conventional Weapons is re-emerging as an important source of international humanitarian law.

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