Congress’s Classification Infrastructure

Currently, the Senate has several SCIFs for some of the relevant committees with jurisdiction over different facets of the United States’ war powers: one for the Select Committee on Intelligence, one for the Armed Services Committee, and one for the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. In addition, the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs has its own SCIF. Notably missing from this group is the Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC), which is charged with originating authorizations for the use of force, among other subject areas that clearly require regular access to classified material. Instead, SFRC is relegated to using an “all purpose” SCIF located in the Capitol Building that is utilized by all other Senators, cleared personal office staffers, and other committees and subcommittees that have access to classified material (known as the “Senate Security SCIF”). As a result, SFRC effectively shares one terminal with the rest of the Senate. This is all compounded by the fact that the Senate SCIF in the Capitol Building can only be accessed during standard work hours. The House does better and has a SCIF for each committee that has oversight jurisdiction over the United States’ war making ability.

Both the House and Senate use a system known as CAPNET for classified material access. It frequently takes members and cleared staff months to obtain an account. Even after they gain an account, the system does not provide many tools essential to effective oversight. For example, there is no system to notify members or their staff when the executive branch produces relevant classified material, a problem compounded by the fact that the executive branch often fails to proactively send updates via unclassified email. Contrast this to the executive branch, where officers and cleared civil servants are often on the classified network within days of onboarding and generally have much better access to the classified information necessary to do their jobs.

Members of Congress also lack adequate access to phones that are approved for secure conversations, classified meeting rooms, or Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC) facilities. This exacerbates the difficulties Senators and staff have in setting up classified briefings, communicating with executive branch personnel—and each other—about critical national security issues, and securing access to classified information in a timely manner.

The inadequate classification infrastructure is more than a mere inconvenience; it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to exercise adequate oversight of the United States’ defense and foreign policy programs. These issues are particularly pervasive with respect to the SFRC. SFRC’s oversight responsibilities include jurisdiction over foreign military interventions, war declarations, foreign military assistance, and other sensitive national security matters. While Congress works to reassert its authority over the United States’ war powers, one of the most integral committees is left out in the cold by the Senate’s lack of adequate infrastructure. This deficiency is indicative of a larger issue across the United States government, which underfunds the foreign service and over-relies on military force to solve complex international issues.

The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution both require that Congress play a central role in making decisions about how to deploy military force abroad. But Congress cannot do that if its members and their staff do not know the essential information about the threats the United States faces and the capabilities it can deploy to address those threats. Given current constraints, Congress not only cannot receive all the information it needs, but members and their staff cannot engage in exchanges with the key executive branch officials that could help ensure that the decisions being made reflect the values and interests of the United States. The infrastructure-related aspects of these problems are not inevitable. If Congress wishes to reassert its war making authority and end endless war, it can and should update this infrastructure.

How to Fix the Problem

Congress can remove the infrastructural barriers by implementing several key reforms. First, the Senate should construct a dedicated SCIF for SFRC. This would allow Senators on the Committee and their cleared staff to access important classified information and would eliminate the barrier posed by the inaccessibility of the Senate Security SCIF. The modest cost to construct and operate a SCIF is justified by the improved oversight it would allow.

Second, Congress should ensure that every SCIF, both legacy and newly constructed, has a sufficient number of secure spaces with computer terminals and phones. Congress should also significantly expand access to SVTC facilities. Expanding these facilities would make it far easier for members and staff to schedule calls and hold classified briefings with executive branch officials—events that are currently challenging to schedule in person or in the limited secure teleconference facilities currently available to members and their staff.

Third, Congress should insist on changes to the electronic systems for accessing classified information so that they are more effective and less time-consuming.  The process to obtain a CAPNET account should be expedited, and there should be a system for providing effective notice to members and their staff when relevant classified material is available for them to review. In addition, members and cleared staff who need to access classified information should be given classified email accounts that can communicate, at a minimum, with other members and staff in Congress working on the same programs.

The recent Department of Defense leak is likely at top of mind, and proposals to enhance access to classified information within Congress may seem untimely. However, it should be noted that the number of congressional staff with Top Secret security clearance are a very small portion of the more than one-million people with such access. Moreover, concerns about congressional leaks of classified material are disproportionate to the actual likelihood. While there have been examples of congressional leaks, including inadvertent leaks, these pale in comparison to the leaks from the executive branch. Indeed, all of the recent high-profile leaks of classified material have come from the executive branch.

Constraints on access to classified information needlessly hamper Congress in its ability to exercise effective oversight of the United States’ defense and foreign policy activities. These proposed reforms are all politically achievable – they are non-partisan, cost-justified, and effective. Congress should help its members and staff do their critically important oversight jobs by implementing these reforms.

IMAGE: Committee chairman Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) confers with ranking member Sen. James Risch (R-ID) during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Capitol Hill March 10, 2022 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

The post It’s Time to Fix Congress’ Classification Infrastructure appeared first on Just Security.

Speaking yesterday in The Hague, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for accountability for the crime of aggression. After calling for a minute of silence “in memory of all those whose lives were taken by Russia, by its terror,” he proclaimed, “Only one Russian crime led to all of these crimes. This is a crime of aggression. The start of evil, the primary crime. There should be responsibility for this crime! And it can only be enforced by the Tribunal.” That same day, Zelenskyy declared that Ukraine opposes “hybrid” formats for such a court: “We will work without any hybrid formats, we will work on a specific tribunal to ensure accountability for their crimes, murders, and torture. We understand who gave the orders. These people must not be untouchable. This is very important for us, this is one of the fundamental issues.”

As previous entries in this series have explained at some length, there is currently no international court with jurisdiction to try the crime of aggression in Ukraine. While there is widespread support for closing this accountability gap, there is significant disagreement as to how to do that. Zelenskyy’s announcement yesterday places him at odds with the Biden administration, which has endorsed a court “rooted in Ukraine’s judicial system, but that also includes international elements”—precisely the kind of “hybrid” court Zelenskyy has now outright rejected.  Among other shortcomings, such a hybrid approach would not be able to indict Putin as long as he remains in office.  That makes the approach a non-starter for Ukrainians.

Zelenskyy instead supports creating a court pursuant to a United Nations General Assembly resolution requesting the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the government of Ukraine to create a Special Tribunal, an approach that also has supporters in the U.S. Congress. But some have asked whether that approach is possible—can an international tribunal to try the crime of aggression be established by the U.N. without the involvement of the Security Council? As this article will explain, there is ample reason to conclude that it can.

The U.N. Charter

Let’s begin with the U.N. Charter. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council are responsible for the core mission of the Charter – that is, in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter makes clear that, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has exclusive authority to authorize military interventions. It also has exclusive authority, under Article 48, to authorize enforcement measures and to compel members of the U.N. to take actions that it determines are required for the maintenance of international peace and security. But this leaves a significant role for the General Assembly.

Article 1 of the Charter sets out the purposes of the U.N., including, first:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Article 2(2), moreover, establishes an obligation for all Member States, as one of the principles of the U.N., to “fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”

The purpose of maintaining international peace and security appears throughout the Charter and influences the interpretation of other articles. For example, Article 2 stipulates principles by which the Organization and member states must abide in pursuit of the purpose of the U.N., most notably including the prohibition on the threat of or use of force. Many of the powers available to the General Assembly and the Security Council are premised on the organs’ duty to prevent or respond to breaches or threats to international peace and security. It follows from the terms of the Charter and the customary law of treaties that member states must refrain from acts that frustrate the Charter’s raison d’etre, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security.

The crime of aggression, “the supreme international crime,” is in the postwar era defined in reference to the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) provides, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Hence there is little question that the creation of a special tribunal to try the crime of aggression – to hold those responsible for the violation of this foundational principle of the Charter – is critical to upholding one of the core purposes of the U.N., as well as the “object and purpose” of the Charter, as understood under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Article 10 empowers the General Assembly to “discuss any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present charter” and to “make recommendations” to either the General Assembly or the Security Council on such matters. This article grants the General Assembly the authority to consider what measures may be taken to counter a threat to international peace and security, particularly in instances where the Security Council fails to act. Indeed, Article 10 was widely considered the primary basis in the creation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which provides that “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.” Article 10 was also invoked in the recent Liechtenstein veto reform initiative, which provides that any time a permanent member of the Security Council vetoes a resolution, that resolution will be automatically referred to the General Assembly within 10 working days so that the Assembly can hold a debate on the situation.

Article 11 empowers the General Assembly to consider, discuss, and make recommendations with regard to both general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, or any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security before it. Subsection (2) provides that “[a]ny such question on which action is necessary” must be referred to the Security Council. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Certain Expenses case interpreted this provision to mean only that General Assembly may not undertake coercive or enforcement actions. It is widely agreed, for example, that the General Assembly is within its power to call upon members to impose sanctions as a collective measure against offending states. Indeed, in the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ also upheld the competence of the General Assembly under this article to establish a voluntary peacekeeping force, though it was careful to note that only the Security Council may “order coercive action.”

Article 24 indicates that Member States “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” In using the word “primary,” Article 24 of the U.N. Charter implicitly acknowledges that the General Assembly is a residual insurer of the object and purpose of the Charter. That interpretation was confirmed by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, in which the Court held that the Security Council maintains primary—but not exclusive—responsibility over peace and security, particularly in light of its Chapter VII powers, because “[t]he Charter makes it abundantly clear … that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security.” The ICJ reaffirmed the Security Council’s primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in its Wall Advisory Opinion.

Last, while the General Assembly resolution would “request” the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the government of Ukraine to create a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, such requests are understood to create an obligation on the Secretary-General to act. Under Article 98 of the U.N. Charter, the Secretary-General “shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him” by the General Assembly.

Historical Practice

Turning next to historical practice: While there is no perfect analog, there is substantial practice that suggests that a Special Tribunal to try the Crime of Aggression can be created through an agreement between the U.N. and Ukraine, pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly. Here we discuss several examples of prior General Assembly action that offer insight into the organ’s authority as it has been exercised to date. It is important to note at the outset that such a tribunal would not be able to order coercive measures on any non-consenting state – for example, it could not compel them to carry out arrests of those it indicts. It could, however, accept the voluntary assistance of member states in carrying out its mission.

United Nations Administrative Tribunal & Internal Justice System (1949)

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) was established by the General Assembly through passage of a Resolution in 1949. The tribunal was an independent organ that could hear and judge internal administrative matters, such as employment contract disputes. Though the Tribunal no longer operates, its successor does: In a series of resolutions beginning in 2007, the General Assembly replaced the Tribunal with a two-tier International Justice System. That system “provides an internal system of justice for all UN system staff” and has the power to resolve disputes both formally and informally.

In a 1954 Advisory Opinion, Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the ICJ considered the legality of the Tribunal, which it described as “an independent and truly judicial body pronouncing judgments without appeal within the limited field of its functions.” As it observed, “[t]he legal power of the General Assembly to establish a tribunal competent to render judgements binding on the United Nations has been challenged. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the General Assembly has been given this power by the Charter.”

The Court began by observing that there was “no express provision for the establishment of judicial bodies or organs and no indication to the contrary.” But that silence was not the end of the story. The Court noted that it had earlier determined that, “[u]nder international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” The Court went on to note that, among other things, the Secretary-General is “the chief administrative officer of the Organization.” It was “inevitable,” the Court noted, “that there would be disputes between the Organization and staff members as to their rights and duties.” And while the Charter does not authorize any of the U.N. organs to adjudicate these disputes, it would “hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation of the United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them.” It thus concluded that the power to establish a tribunal that could resolve such disputes “arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter.”

Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000)

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created by Secretary-General based on a request by Security Council acting under Chapter VI, not Chapter VII. In Resolution 1315, the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General negotiate with the Government of Sierra Leone to establish an independent special court. Because the Security Council did not act under Chapter VII (and because the Court was created by agreement between the U.N. and Sierra Leone, and not other states), the SCSL was unable to require non-consenting states to execute its arrest warrants. Nonetheless, the tribunal was properly characterized as an “international” court and thus empowered to set aside personal immunities. Indeed, the SCSL Appeals Chamber specifically found that a sitting head of state of a foreign state that was not party to the agreement between Sierra Leone and the U.N. – Liberian President Charles Taylor – was subject to prosecution in the court for crimes committed in Sierra Leone and could not rely on personal immunities to avoid indictment. In making this finding, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that when the U.N. Security Council called for the establishment of the court, it was acting on behalf of all U.N. Members and, thus, the agreement giving rise to the court was “an agreement between all members of the UN and Sierra Leone”—making it “truly international.”

This precedent offers at least two important lessons: First, Chapter VII authority is not essential to creation of an international criminal tribunal, as the Security Council acted under Chapter VI in creating the SCSL (and thus was not exercising coercive authority). Second, a tribunal created through an agreement negotiated by the Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations and a member state can constitute an “international tribunal” for purposes of personal immunities with regard to the head of state of a non-consenting state. In the case of the SCSL, that negotiation took place pursuant to a request in a resolution of the Security Council acting under Chapter VI; a resolution of the General Assembly would arguably have at least as strong a claim to represent the membership of the U.N.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003)

The General Assembly gave rise to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Cambodia approached the United Nations, requesting “assistance of the United Nations and the international community in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.” General Assembly Resolution 52/135 then requested that the Secretary-General establish a Group of Experts for Cambodia, which recommended that “the United Nations should establish an ad hoc international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge officials for crimes against humanity and genocide . . . that the Security Council establish this tribunal under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or, should it not do so, that the General Assembly establish it.” Cambodia instead decided on an alternative approach—the creation of a tribunal within the Cambodian legal system. In Assembly Resolution 57/228, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General negotiate with Cambodia an agreement creating the Extraordinary Chambers and regulating the cooperation between the U.N. and Cambodia. While the ECCC is located within the Cambodian court system, it provides clear evidence that the General Assembly can contribute to the establishment of a treaty-based tribunal.

International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (Syria) (2017)

In 2016, the Assembly responded to a Security Council deadlock (caused by Russia’s veto) in the face of evidence of Syrian atrocities through the adoption of Resolution 71/248, establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (the “IIIM”).

During debate and in a note-verbale, dated Feb. 8, 2017, Russia complained that “the General Assembly acted ultra vires—going beyond its powers as specified in . . . the Charter of the United Nations.” It claimed that the mechanism vested powers that were prosecutorial in nature and that “prosecutions, criminal investigations and support of criminal investigations are not among the functions of the General Assembly. It cannot create an organ that has more powers than the Assembly itself.” General Assembly debate and voting records show that UN members were not persuaded by this argument. Supporting members reaffirmed that the purpose of the mechanism (which was, unlike the ECCC and SCSL, created over the territorial state’s objection), was not to prosecute, but to “facilitate and expedite criminal proceedings, without prejudice to where and when such proceedings will take place.” Underpinning discussions about the mechanism was Member States’ explicit sense of urgency for the General Assembly to take action in response to the gridlock in the Security Council, which was blocking the Council from fulfilling its mandate to maintain international peace and security. The creation of the IIIM was viewed as a key step to preserve evidence and signal Members’ non-tolerance of impunity, which may account for the speed with which the Resolution advanced through the drafting and consultation process and went into operation.

The Jurisdiction of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression

The Charter, together with the historical examples, demonstrate that General Assembly has the authority to request that the Secretary-General enter an agreement with Ukraine to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression. But there is a further question as to the source of the court’s jurisdiction, given the General Assembly’s lack of enforcement powers.

The new Special Tribunal could be conferred international criminal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in two ways. First, as with the courts formed for Sierra Leone and Cambodia (and unlike the IIIM), where the territorial state consents through entering into an international agreement with the United Nations, it vests the tribunal with a jurisdictional title. Second, because the crime of aggression is rooted in customary international law and the prohibition of aggression is a jus cogens norm, there is a strong case that there is an existing international jurisdiction that need only be activated. This international criminal jurisdiction—“rooted in the international community as a whole”—can be activated when an international tribunal acquires it through a specific instrument, like a negotiated agreement between the U.N. and a member State. Under either approach cases, the U.N. General Assembly would not vest the special tribunal with jurisdiction, “it would,” as an earlier Just security article explained, “only help activat[e] the proper international exercise of an already existing jurisdiction.”

Both the SCSL and the ECCC took the first approach: the consent of the territorial state formed the basis for the court’s jurisdiction. The Security Council acting under Chapter VI and the General Assembly, respectively, acted to activate the exercise of existing jurisdiction. The same approach could be utilized by the Special Tribunal. Ukraine is, after all, one of the territorial States of the crime as the victim of Russia’s aggression and possesses a jurisdiction title that it can confer to an international tribunal for the purpose of adjudication.

The capacity of such a Tribunal is not limited to the capacity of the consenting state, here Ukraine, to try the crime in its own domestic courts. An international Tribunal created by a negotiated agreement between the Secretary-General and a consenting state to try a crime under international law creates a court with an international character. That, in turn, allows the court to set aside personal immunities that would restrict prosecutions in foreign domestic courts, including the courts of the consenting state. This was true of the SCSL, which could indict a sitting foreign head of state even though Sierra Leone’s own domestic courts would have been barred from acting by personal immunity. This same principle animates the ICC. The ICC is not limited by personal immunities and thus exercises greater authority than is possessed by the individual states whose consent is the basis for the court’s jurisdiction. In a recent Just Security article, Leila Sadat defends what she terms this “collective conferral” authority. It is precisely this authority that allows the ICC to indict Putin – the head of state of a non-state party who would otherwise be immune from prosecution.

Conclusion

Viewing the law and history together paint a clear picture: First, the Charter’s central purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security, and, where the Security Council is unable to act, the General Assembly possesses subsidiary powers to uphold this core purpose. Second, the General Assembly is capable of passing a Resolution that leads to the creation of a body with a decidedly judicial character. Third, the U.N. General Assembly has the authority to request the Secretary-General act to establish a Special Tribunal that would allow the exercise of an existing jurisdiction—and the Secretary General would be obligated to take steps to carry out that request. That court, in turn, would have an international character and thus would not be required to observe personal immunities for an international crime even though the consenting state’s own courts would be.

In sum, it is clear that General Assembly is empowered to request that the Secretary-General conclude a treaty with Ukraine to establish a Special Tribunal to try the crime of aggression committed in and against Ukraine.

IMAGE: United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres speaks during the 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the U.N. headquarters on September 20, 2022 in New York City. Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

The post The Legal Authority to Create a Special Tribunal to Try the Crime of Aggression Upon the Request of the UN General Assembly appeared first on Just Security.

Editor’s note: This article is part of our ongoing series on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA), which Congress passed on Dec. 15 and President Joe Biden signed today, contains sweeping new transparency requirements for international agreements. The legislation, led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chair Robert Menendez, implements a number of the reforms that we argued for in our 2020 article, “The Failed Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements.” The legislation also for the first time imposes transparency requirements for nonbinding agreements, something that we had also argued for as a possible reform. Before now, those agreements had not been subject to any publication or congressional reporting requirements, even though, as we document in a forthcoming article, they have become a significant part of the United States’ international agreements practice. While there are still important gaps in the oversight regime, this legislative enactment represents the most significant transparency reform for international agreements in a half century.

International Agreement-Making in the United States

The Constitution specifies only one process by which the federal government can make international agreements: Article II provides that presidents can make treaties “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” But since the early days of the nation, presidents have also concluded agreements, binding on the nation under international law, based on either authorization in statutes or on their own constitutional authority. Since the 1930s, these “executive agreements” have far outnumbered Article II treaties. From 1939 to 1989, for example, the United States concluded over 11,000 executive agreements and only about 700 treaties. In recent years, the number of Article II treaties has dropped even further.

Congress has sought to regulate executive agreements primarily through a combination of publication and reporting obligations. A statute dating to 1950 requires the State Department to publish non-classified executive agreements within 180 days after they take effect. Since 1994, however, the Department has been allowed to exempt from publication those agreements for which it concludes that “the public interest . . . is insufficient to justify their publication.” State Department regulations currently allow for sixteen categories of agreements to be exempted from publication. In our 2020 article, we found that less than half of the agreements being reported to Congress were getting published.

In the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972, Congress required transmission of executive agreements to Congress within 60 days after they take effect. Pursuant to regulations adopted by the State Department, when the Department sends the agreements to Congress it includes a background statement containing “a precise citation of legal authority.” But these statements are not released to the public. We obtained thousands of these statements in connection with our 2020 article, and we found that the citations to legal authority were hard to parse and often involved a kitchen sink approach, and that in nearly 20 percent of the examples the citations did not appear to provide plausible legal support for the agreement. Congress has amended the Case-Zablocki Act several times in response to late and under-reporting of agreements, and in our 2020 article we found that this under-compliance problem has persisted.

In recent years, the executive branch has increasingly relied on yet another kind of instrument: nonbinding agreements. Nonbinding agreements vary greatly in form and can cover almost a limitless range of topics.  They often have all or most of the formal features of a binding agreement, yet they are understood not to create binding international obligations. Well-known examples include the Iran nuclear deal that was concluded by the Obama administration in 2015 and the Trump administration deal with the Taliban committing to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. As we show in a forthcoming article, “The Rise of Nonbinding Agreements,” high-profile agreements like the Iran deal are simply the tip of the iceberg of a large and under-studied body of nonbinding agreements concluded by the executive branch. Many of these agreements are concluded at the administrative agency level and concern a vast array of subjects, from antitrust enforcement, to tax reform, to nuclear proliferation. Prior to the 2023 NDAA, however, the transparency requirements that applied to binding agreements did not apply to nonbinding agreements. As a result, many international agreements concluded by the United States have been shielded not only from public view but from Congress and sometimes even the State Department itself, which may not know of nonbinding agreements concluded by other agencies.

Transparency Requirements in the 2023 NDAA

The NDAA amends the Case-Zablocki Act in five important respects. First, it strengthens the congressional reporting provisions relating to executive agreements. Instead of requiring that executive agreements be reported within 60 days after they have taken effect (which is sometimes long after they are concluded), the NDAA requires that the State Department report to congressional leadership, the SFRC, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) all executive agreements that are concluded each month. In addition, the legislation requires the Department to provide a “detailed description of the legal authority” that provides support for the agreement. For this legal authority, citations to statutes, treaties, and the Constitution must include the specific provisions that are relevant, and citations to Article II of the Constitution must include an explanation for why it supports the agreement. The State Department must also include a description of any new or amended statutory or regulatory authority anticipated to be required to fully implement each agreement.

Second, the legislation greatly expands the publication of executive agreements. Instead of limiting publication to those agreements that the State Department deems sufficiently within the public interest, almost all non-classified executive agreements must be published on the State Department’s website within 120 days after they enter into force. (There are carveouts for, among other things, various types of military agreements as well as grant agreements.) Moreover, publication will now for the first time include information about the executive branch’s legal authority to conclude the agreements—a gap we highlighted in our 2020 article.

Third, the legislation facilitates greater centralization of, and accountability for, transparency oversight within the executive branch. It builds in several ways on a pre-existing requirement in the Case Act that departments and agencies consult with the State Department before concluding any executive agreement: It requires that any department or agency that concludes an executive agreement must provide the State Department with the text of the agreement, along with the legal authority for concluding it, within 15 days after signing or concluding it. Moreover, each department or agency that enters into executive agreements must designate a “Chief International Agreements Officer” to ensure compliance with these obligations. And at least every three years, the Comptroller General is directed to audit the State Department’s compliance with the reporting and publication obligations. The law appropriates $1,000,000 per year for five years to the State Department to address the additional expenses associated with compliance.

Fourth, the legislation for the first time imposes transparency requirements for nonbinding agreements. The congressional reporting and publication obligations described above apply to what the legislation refers to as “qualifying non-binding instruments.” That category is defined as encompassing nonbinding agreements that “could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the foreign policy of the United States” and those that are the subject of a request from the chair or ranking member of either SFRC or HFAC. Qualifying nonbinding instruments falling under either prong of the definition of that term must be reported to Congress and published.  Moreover, the legislation requires that the Secretary provide a “detailed description of the legal authority that, in the view of the Secretary . . . provides authorization for each qualifying non-binding instrument . . . to become operative.” Had this provision been in place at the time the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) was concluded, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry would have had to not only report and publish the agreement but also cite all of the statutory authorities to waive sanctions that he would have to rely on in order to implement the deal.

Fifth, the legislation defines “text” of an international agreement or qualifying nonbinding instrument to include a range of documents not historically reported or published.  It includes “any annex, appendix, codicil, side agreement, side letter, or any document of similar purpose or function  . . . that is entered into contemporaneously and in conduction” with the agreement or arrangement.  It also defines “text” to similarly include implementing agreements or arrangements.  This will likely ensure much greater visibility for Congress and the public into the wide variety of international arrangements, both binding and nonbinding, that the executive branch concludes.

Assessment

These reforms, most of which we advocated in our 2020 article, represent a major step forward for the transparency of the United States’ international agreements practice. Reporting to Congress about binding executive agreements will now be timelier and contain better information concerning the executive branch’s legal authority for the agreements. Broader publication of executive agreements will also help ensure that interested observers can assist Congress in monitoring the agreements. In addition, for the first time, Congress has mandated transparency requirements for nonbinding agreements, making the United States a world leader in reform in this area. Although only a subset of such agreements is covered by the “significant impact on foreign policy” standard, others will be covered by the SFRC/HFAC chair or ranking member request mechanism. The designation of compliance officers within the executive branch and the mandatory GAO audits will likely further increase the effectiveness of the mandates.

As is perhaps inevitable in any compromise legislation, there are gaps and limitations that Congress might consider addressing in future legislation. The legislation exempts from the definition of “non-binding instrument” any agreement “that is signed or otherwise becomes operative or is implemented pursuant to the authorities relied upon by the Department of Defense, the Armed Forces of the United States, or any element of the intelligence community.” This exemption excludes what is likely a large number of military and intelligence agreements from the new transparency requirements. The legislation also maintains and expands carveouts from publication requirements for international agreements and nonbinding instruments dealing with various military matters. These exemptions create a major gap in the new oversight regime. As part of the work on our new article, we have settled a lawsuit against the DOD brought under FOIA in which the Department has identified more than six thousand nonbinding agreements, which it is in the process of producing under our settlement agreement. This dwarfs the number of agreements identified by any other government agency. Based on our current data, the DOD has concluded far more nonbinding agreements than all other agencies in the United States combined since 1989. The carveout for agreements concluded by the DOD therefore means that Congress—and the public—will likely remain blind to the majority of nonbinding agreements concluded by the U.S. government in the years to come. The onus now should be on the armed services committees to move forward with legislation to provide proper congressional oversight of agreements exempted from current transparency mechanisms.

In addition to that carveout, the automatic reporting and publication requirements in the legislation apply only to nonbinding agreements that the State Department deems to have a “significant impact” on U.S. foreign policy, thus excluding those that it deems not to have such an impact. This will give the executive branch substantial discretion to withhold additional nonbinding agreements from publication and reporting, at least unless and until they are requested by a chair or ranking member of SFRC or HFAC. As we found in our 2020 article, similar discretion led the Department to publish fewer than half of binding executive agreements. Congress should consider broadening the law’s coverage of nonbinding agreements.

Another issue not addressed in the NDAA concerns the need for greater clarity in whether agreements are binding or nonbinding. The State Department has issued drafting guidance to help avoid ambiguity, but we have found that this guidance is often ignored in practice. In addition to creating potential foreign relations difficulties, this ambiguity likely leads to under-reporting of binding agreements. Under the NDAA, there is still a significant difference between the reporting obligations for binding and nonbinding agreements, so ensuring that agreements are classified correctly will be important, especially since Congress is now trying to achieve near-total transparency for the binding ones. (It is possible that the agencies’ new duties to send the State Department significant nonbinding agreements will provide a vehicle for State to bring greater clarity to the binding/nonbinding distinction. That would be a welcome development.)

Finally, it may be that Congress will need to add to its own resources to ensure compliance with its transparency mandates. The NDAA provides additional funding to the State Department but does not add staff or other resources on the congressional side. Greater reporting may not mean much if Congress lacks the time and other resources to review what is submitted. Congress already has difficulty properly reviewing the information received in Case Act reports. The greater flow of information that will be generated by the NDAA is likely to make that problem more pronounced.

Although there is room for further improvement, the transparency reforms in the NDAA are a major achievement in congressional oversight of foreign affairs. Achieving this reform required extraordinary commitment from staff and members of Congress, and a willingness by the executive branch to accept the additional oversight. These reforms should set an example for other countries that face similar transparency challenges for international agreements.

IMAGE: The U.S. Capitol building at sunset on March 1, 2022, in Washington, DC. (Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)

The post Congress Mandates Sweeping Transparency Reforms for International Agreements appeared first on Just Security.

The daily evidence of atrocities has helped ignite an effort in the U.S. Congress to ensure that the United States will not become a safe haven for those responsible for these horrors. Last month, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a public hearing on a proposed bill to expand the U.S. war crimes statute to allow the Department of Justice to prosecute foreign war criminals in the United States and a separate bill to allow the Department of Justice to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity. At the hearing, Senator Jon Ossoff (D-GA) raised the importance of complementing these expansions of criminal accountability with renewed legislative attention to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) – a brief statute enacted by the First Congress in 1789 that allows non-U.S. citizens or nationals to file tort claims for violations of international law in U.S. federal courts

As one of us previously wrote with Bill Dodge in Just Security, Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Sherrod Brown (D-OH) introduced the Alien Tort Statute Clarification Act (ATSCA) back in May 2022 to do just that. By affirming that the ATS applies extraterritorially and thereby ensuring that non-Americans have the opportunity to file civil suits in U.S. courts for violations of international law that occur abroad (as long as they are consistent with existing rules of immunity and personal jurisdiction), the ATSCA would allow victims to play a role in punishing those responsible for the horrors they have suffered. Without both new pieces of legislation – criminal and civil – it is likely that some of those responsible for the violations in Ukraine could ultimately join the thousands of other war criminals and human rights violators who have found a safe haven in the United States. It is therefore urgent that Congress take steps to enact the ATSCA as soon as possible.

A Brief History: Has the Alien Tort Statute Made a Difference?

In our recently published article, Has the Alien Tort Statute Made a Difference?: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Assessment, we compiled every ATS case that resulted in a published opinion and confirmed a long-standing hypothesis that the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2013 in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, which held that only a limited number of ATS cases can overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, has been the most significant reason for ATS suit dismissals in the last decade. Our analysis, which includes both empirical analysis of 531 published opinions – from 300 distinct lines of cases – and qualitative evidence from interviews with participants in ATS suits, shows that the statute has played a substantial role in achieving justice for individuals and communities that have faced human rights violations around the world. ATS suits have also importantly contributed to the global development of human rights norms, even as the ATS cause of action was eroded in a series of Supreme Court decisions during the 2000s. 

The ATS was invoked only rarely in the almost two centuries before the Second Circuit’s now famous 1980 ruling in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. There, the court held that the family members of a Paraguayan political dissident had a valid claim under the ATS against a former Paraguayan official living in the United States for the torture and killing of their relative in Paraguay in 1976. When lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights brought the Filártiga case, civil suits alleging violations of international law were rare both in the United States and around the world. At the time, the ATS was seen as one of the only tools globally to enforce international human rights law in domestic courts. For about three decades thereafter, ATS suits grew rapidly in the United States, reaching a high point in the early 2000s when federal courts around the country were consistently issuing between 20 and 40 published opinions on ATS cases every year.

Our analysis of the entire history of ATS cases shows that, judged by the money awards granted to plaintiffs, the ATS has been something of a disappointment. Only 25 cases resulted in monetary judgments for the plaintiffs that were not later overturned. Only six of these judgments appear to have been successfully collected, and only partially. However, that is not the entire story: we also documented 33 settlements in ATS cases, many of which were in the millions of dollars and over half of which were in suits against corporations. A settlement with oil company Unocal allowed Burmese plaintiffs to rebuild homes and communities in the areas where they had been violently displaced by company security forces. Some material benefits to plaintiffs in ATS suits came about even without a court judgment or settlement. Even though the Liberian plaintiffs in Flomo v. Firestone ultimately lost their ATS suit in court, a participant in the lawsuit explained to us that the public attention on the poor labor conditions at Firestone’s rubber plantations resulted in the company “voluntarily” building a new school and several new homes for plantation workers.

In interviews, participants in ATS suits highlighted normative benefits arising from the suits. Truth-telling, exposing wrongdoers, reclaiming dignity, contributing to improved practices, and strengthening respect for international law were often the driving forces behind ATS suits, and many participants described the outcomes of ATS suits in these terms. Two plaintiffs in an ATS suit against U.S. government contractors who had implemented the CIA’s torture programs described getting a great deal of satisfaction out of telling their story over the course of litigation. Moreover, the rise in ATS suits arguably contributed to legislative and policy change. Interviewees linked growing attention to ATS suits to legislative enactments including the passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) and the inclusion of corporate liability in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, first enacted in 2000 and reauthorized most recently in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017 (TVPRA). Many of our interviewees, including the late (and very much missed) John Ruggie, the former U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, also viewed ATS suits as having contributed to the broader business and human rights agenda, including the development of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, perhaps helping motivate corporations to internalize some of the goals of the human rights community. 

As the profile of the ATS grew and an increasing number of cases were filed, including against U.S. government officials, allied governments of the United States, and powerful corporations, there was greater pushback against ATS cases. Starting in 2004 with the decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court curtailed the scope of the ATS. That first decision confined the ATS cause of action to specific, universal, and obligatory norms of international law. Interestingly, this decision had little impact on the cases brought, as courts had long cast a skeptical eye on international law claims – hence the scrutiny was nothing new. The steepest drop off in ATS opinions came after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel in 2013, restricting the territorial scope of the ATS. This decision has been profound because most ATS suits have been brought for violations that took place outside the United States. In our database, only 75 cases were brought for harm that occurred in the United States, while the remaining 220 were brought for violations abroad, including in 95 different countries. (There are 300 lines of cases in our database in total, because some cases split into separate strands as they progressed through the courts.) In 2021, the Court extended its ruling on extraterritoriality in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, holding that U.S. corporations could not be sued for aiding and abetting child slavery in Ivory Coast because their conduct within the United States amounted only to general corporate decision-making while all other activity related to the allegations occurred abroad. By severely limiting the application of the ATS to U.S. corporations aiding and abetting abuses in other countries, the decision has further restricted the utility of the ATS as a tool for advancing human rights.

The Potential for Revival Through the Alien Tort Statute Clarification Act

The ATSCA would revive the ATS cause of action by clarifying that the statute applies extraterritorially. The text of the ATSCA provides that “the district courts of the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any tort [covered by the ATS if] . . . an alleged defendant is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . or an alleged defendant is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged defendant.” The extraterritorial application of the ATS has always made sense given the transnational nature of international law. For example, enforcing the prohibition on piracy, one of the oldest and most well established norms of international law and which the courts have uniformly recognized is a cause of action that can be maintained under the ATS, has almost always required U.S. courts to adjudicate conduct that occurred outside of the territorial boundaries of the state. Justice Breyer articulated in his concurring opinion in Kiobel that “[c]ertainly today’s pirates include torturers and perpetrators of genocide. And today, like the pirates of old, they are ‘fair game’ where they are found.”

The Supreme Court has repeatedly invited Congress to clarify the scope of the ATS if it misread Congress’s intent. The ATSCA is an answer to that request – it would reassert Congress’s authority over the scope of the ATS and clarify that, yes, the United States intends to play its role in disciplining human rights abusers with sufficient connections to the United States. 

The ATSCA would ensure that U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases against those who commit violations of the most fundamental norms of international law if perpetrators come to the United States or are otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction in the country – whether a human rights abuser who committed atrocities abroad before seeking refuge in the United States or a corporation based in the United States seeking unfair competitive advantage. Small and mid-sized companies argued in an amicus brief in Nestlé that such jurisdictional clarity would in fact make good business sense and is important for leveling the playing field: Right now, U.S. businesses that violate international human rights abroad – by, for example, aiding and abetting violations of the human rights of communities that object to development projects – have an unfair advantage over those who do not, because the narrowed interpretation of the ATS’s jurisdiction prevents them from being held to account in U.S. courts. The ATSCA would take away that unfair advantage.

The erosion of the ATS cause of action’s extraterritorial application in the United States sets U.S. courts apart from the trend taking place in the rest of the world. Courts in several other countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France have recently held they can exercise jurisdiction over international law violations committed extraterritorially, including by corporations. The ATSCA would bring the United States back in line with the growing recognition that civil liability regimes that grant redress to foreigners are an important element of domestic courts upholding international law. And it would help ensure that U.S. courts are the ones who discipline U.S. corporations for such violations, rather than relying on courts abroad to clean up their messes.

A Revived ATS Within Broader Efforts to Protect Human Rights Today

To be sure, the ATSCA alone will not provide full material or normative relief to individuals or communities facing human rights violations around the world today. Our research also illustrates how a multi-pronged approach to human rights advocacy is necessary. While in the 1980s the ATS was seen as one of the only tools for seeking redress for victims of human rights abuses, today global activists use a variety of tools in seeking justice that should ideally work in tandem with one another. Increasingly, lawyers bringing human rights cases in wealthy nations are recognizing the importance of building coalitions with lawyers and legal activists around the world, including to strengthen efforts to bring cases before domestic courts in the countries where human rights violations occur. There should also be more attention directed towards non-adversarial approaches to addressing human rights violations, such as advocacy to strengthen the internal grievance mechanisms of international institutions and other efforts that are potentially less resource intensive than litigation. Legislatively, an increasing number of countries have been enacting mandatory corporate human rights due diligence laws aimed directly at closing the gaps in corporate accountability for aiding and abetting human rights violations abroad. The United States should follow suit to pass such obligations for U.S. companies, a proposal that some U.S. corporations have already supported.

The ATSCA, while not a panacea, would revive one important tool for protecting human rights. It deserves the attention of the Senate Judiciary Committee now.

(Editor’s Note: The third author has been removed at that author’s request due to a unique set of extenuating personal circumstances and with the principal authors’ agreement. No content has changed.)

IMAGE: A woman walks past a damaged building in Lyman, Donetsk region, on October 21, 2022, after the recapture of the area from the Russian forces, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Dimitar DILKOFF / AFP) (Photo by DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Why We Need the Alien Tort Statute Clarification Act Now appeared first on Just Security.

President Joe Biden has reportedly signed a new classified policy memorandum for conducting counterterrorism drone strikes outside conventional war zones. While its aim of reducing risks to civilians is admirable, the memorandum contains notable exceptions and loopholes. These topics will be covered by others who are reflecting on the new policy in Just Security today and over the coming week. Here, however, I want to speak to a different concern: the way in which the new counterterrorism policies have been formulated and publicized.

First, the memorandum is classified. According to Charlie Savage, reporting for the New York Times, “it was described by a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to explain its key aspects.” This secrecy undermines democracy by making it impossible for the public to know precisely what the rules are that are guiding the country’s use of lethal force abroad. Even if there are some rules that cannot be fully disclosed for security reasons, surely the essential elements can be (as they have been in the past following successful FOIA requests).

This leak—or what David Pozen might call a “pleak,” neither a plant nor a leak but something in between—is not a substitute for full disclosure by the government of the rules that regulate American war-making. Allowing the public to learn about the policy from the leak and from academics and former government officials like those writing today for Just Security, who are experts at reading the tea leaves it contains, is no substitute for complete public disclosure and debate.

Second, it is notable that Congress seemingly has played no role at all in determining how the United States uses force abroad in this context. These days, we tend to take Congress’ impotence in the area of war powers for granted, but we shouldn’t. Recall that, while the President is “Commander in Chief,” it is Congress that has the Constitutional authority to “declare War.” And it is Congress that has the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” “raise and support Armies,” and “provide and maintain a Navy.” Congress, in other words, is supposed to not just be consulted in decisions to wage and regulate warfare, it is supposed to be an essential participant.  And yet, as in previous iterations of similar policy guidance, Congress appears to have been sidelined, as President Biden adopted these rules solely as a “Presidential Policy Memorandum” (PPM). This further entrenches the idea that it is up to the president, not Congress, to determine the course of the country’s counterterrorism program.

Third, the PPM is a policy, rather than legal, document. It therefore may be disregarded easily at the President’s discretion, and without public notice. President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump made similar choices in previous iterations of the PPM, the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) and Principles, Standards, and Procedures (PSP) respectively. Adopting constraints on the use of force as a matter of policy, rather than as a matter of law, has a major downside—they can be easily and quickly reversed, as we learned when President Trump dropped crucial restrictions contained in Obama’s PPG, thus undoing much of the hard-fought progress that had been made in adopting it in the first place.

By contrast, adopting limits on the use of force as a matter of law could lead to real, sustained progress because it could serve to bind successors to abide by those constraints. (Which is, of course, why administrations are allergic to such statements—executive branch lawyers, and their policy clients, hate to give up any future room to maneuver.) President Obama made a small step in this direction when he announced in 2011 that the United States considered Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to be customary international law (or at least, that it would “choose out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well”). The progress was limited by the lack of clarity as to whether the statement applied to non-international armed conflicts as well, which the U.S. military has engaged in much more frequently than international armed conflicts in recent decades.

These problems are not irremediable. The administration could address these failures. It could follow up the leak to Charlie Savage by disclosing the new PPM with minimal necessary redactions. And it could work with Congress to repeal and replace the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and adopt key limitations on the use of force as a matter of law. It could, moreover, announce that it accepts certain international law obligations on the use of force as obligatory—for example, it could accept clearer legal restrictions, not just policy restrictions, on civilian casualties. Each step would mark real progress. Until then, however, the policy memorandum represents just one more stepping stone in the long path of the forever war.

IMAGE: A U.S. Predator unmanned drone armed with a missile stands on the tarmac of Kandahar military airport in Afghanistan on June 13, 2010. (Massoud Hossaini via Getty Images)

The post Biden’s New Counterterrorism Policy Guidance Further Entrenches the Forever War appeared first on Just Security.

[Примітка редактора: ця стаття є частиною серії статей від Just Security, “Переслідування злочину агресії, вчиненого щодо України”. Усі статті серії можна знайти тут.]

Останні два тижні принесли багатообіцяючі новини про те, що спроба України відтіснити російську армію неймовірним чином починає досягати успіху. Можливий зсув у війні привносить оновлену необхідність в розмову, яка почалася незабаром після початку війни — як притягнути до відповідальності за злочин агресії, скоєної під час початку війни в лютому 2022 року та продовжуваного здійснення військового наступу з явним порушенням заборони застосування сили за статтею 2(4) Статуту ООН.

Ця стаття є першою в серії, яка базується на зустрічі, що відбулася влітку 2022 року в Єльському клубі в Нью-Йорку і мала на меті сформулювати детальну та конкретну пропозицію щодо трибуналу для розгляду справи про злочин агресії в Україні. Резюме Очільника містить огляд зустрічі, яка була організована Постійним представництвом Ліхтенштейну при ООН та Постійним представництвом Латвії при ООН і в якій взяли участь представники Уряду України, а також ряду інших держав-членів ООН, науковці та члени громадянського суспільства.

У цій серії кілька учасників зустрічі продумують, як уряд України та Організація Об’єднаних Націй могли б співпрацювати для створення трибуналу. Я починаю цю серію з вивчення аргументів щодо створення міжнародного трибуналу, а саме його створення через угоду з Організацією Об’єднаних Націй, діючи за рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї. У наступних трьох статтях Астрід Рейзінгер Корачіні, Дженніфер Трахан і колишній посол США з особливих доручень з питань воєнних злочинів Девід Дж. Схеффер обговорять особливості потенційного трибуналу. Разом ці статті пропонують шаблон, який міг би стати основою для нового міжнародного суду. Наприкінці Клаус Кресс, спеціальний радник прокурора МКС з питань злочину агресії, виступивши у своїй особистій якості, завершить серію.

Важливість судового переслідування за злочин агресії

Ставки нинішнього конфлікту надзвичайно високі. Коли Росія почала війну проти України в лютому 2022 року, вона почала найбільшу транскордонну сухопутну війну в Європі з часів Другої світової війни. Це сталося після незаконної анексії Криму Росією в 2014 році, першого завоювання території в Європі після Другої світової війни. Ці акти є відвертим викликом глобальній забороні на застосування сили та завоювання територій.

Статут Організації Об’єднаних Націй, який був створений наприкінці Другої світової війни для підтримки та збереження міжнародного миру, в своїй основі містить заборону на застосування сили. Стаття 2(4) передбачає: “У своїх міжнародних відносинах усі члени утримуються від загрози або застосування сили проти територіальної цілісності чи політичної незалежності будь-якої держави або будь-яким іншим способом, що суперечить цілям Організації Об’єднаних Націй”. Хоча ця заборона на війну, безумовно, не була дотримана досконало, вона сприяла надзвичайному скороченню міждержавних воєн у післявоєнну епоху та зробила захоплення території, яке колись було звичайним, надзвичайно рідкісним. Це дало змогу розростатися торгівлі та розвитку по всьому світу без страху, що здобутки стануть легкою здобиччю під час війни. І це дозволило малим державам, які колись боялися за своє існування, натомість вижити без перешкод. Це немалим чином вплинуло на те, що кількість незалежних суверенних держав зросла приблизно втричі від кінця війни до сьогодні.

Вторгнення Росії в Україну за сприяння Білорусі є не просто кричущим порушенням норми міжнародного права; це становить загрозу фундаментальному принципу, який лежить в основі сучасного правового порядку. Ось чому глобальна реакція на війну була такою потужною, коли держави об’єдналися, щоб забезпечити Україну зброєю та іншими поставками. І саме тому ці зусилля мають супроводжуватися кримінальним переслідуванням найбільш відповідальних за злочин агресії.

Злочин агресії вперше було розглянуто в міжнародному суді внаслідок Другої світової війни в місці, що стане відомим як Міжнародний військовий трибунал у Нюрнберзі. Союзники звинуватили 24 німецьких політичних, військових і економічних лідерів у попередньому плануванні агресивної війни “в порушення умов пакту Келлога-Бріана 1928 року” — договору, який вперше заборонив війну і тим самим створив основу для статті 2(4) Статуту ООН. У своєму рішенні Нюрнберзький суд проголосив: “Розпочати загарбницьку війну… це не лише міжнародний злочин; це найвищий міжнародний злочин, який відрізняється від інших військових злочинів лише тим, що містить у собі накопичене зло в цілому”.

Це потужне речення зафіксувало важливий факт про злочин агресії — під час війни злочин агресії є міжнародним злочином, з якого випливають усі інші. Якби не незаконна агресія проти України, не було б ні злочинів проти людяності, ні воєнних злочинів, ні геноциду. Крім того, це напад не лише на країну, яка потерпає фізичної атаки, але й напад на міжнародне співтовариство в цілому. Ось чому створення форуму для покарання за такі злочини є настільки важливим.

І все ж немає міжнародного суду з юрисдикцією щодо злочину агресії проти України. Україна, Росія та Білорусь не є сторонами Римського статуту, який створив Міжнародний кримінальний суд (МКС) і надав йому юрисдикцію. За нормальних обставин це означатиме, що МКС не матиме юрисдикції над подіями, які відбуваються в Україні. Однак Україна подала заяву щодо визнання юрисдикції суду в 2014 році та продовжила цю юрисдикцію на невизначений термін у 2015 році. На основі цих заяв суд може розглядати справи про геноцид, злочини проти людяності та військові злочини, скоєні в Україні, і прокурор уже розпочав розслідувати ті злочини. Однак через політичний компроміс злочин агресії відрізняється: на відміну від трьох інших злочинів у Римському статуті, за злочин агресії не можуть бути притягнуті до відповідальності громадяни держав, які не є сторонами Статуту, включаючи Росію та Білорусь. І хоча є пропозиції змінити це положення, будь-яка поправка, ймовірно, займе щонайменше рік, якщо вона взагалі відбудеться. І навіть якщо це буде зроблено, перегляд, швидше за все, застосовуватиметься перспективно, не маючи зворотньої дії у часі. Таким чином, міжнародна відповідальність за злочин агресії проти України майже безсумнівно вимагає створення нового міжнародного трибуналу.

Аргументи щодо створення Трибуналу шляхом укладення угоди між Україною та Організацією Об’єднаних Націй

На засіданні Єльського клубу було запропоновано створити трибунал для розгляду злочинів агресії через угоду між Україною та ООН за рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї.

Це далеко не єдина пропозиція створити трибунал для розгляду злочину агресії в Україні. Одним із перших, колишній прем’єр-міністр Сполученого Королівства Гордон Браун закликав до створення спеціального трибуналу, до якого країни могли б приєднатися у своєрідну спеціальну правову “коаліцію бажаючих”. Філіп Сендс працює з європейськими законодавцями над створенням трибуналу в Європі. Нещодавно Рада Європи прийняла рішення про відповідальність за злочин агресії. Група міжнародного публічного права та політики (PILPG) запропонувала проєкт закону про Український Вищий суд у справах про військові злочини – спеціалізований суд у національній судовій системі України, який буде переслідувати жорстокі злочини, включаючи злочин агресії, які не переслідуються в МКС. Open Society Justice Initiative розробила зразок обвинувального акту, який можна використовувати на багатьох форумах. І також є пропозиція, схожа на пропозицію Єльського клубу від Української робочої групи Global Accountability Network, яка пропонує резолюцію Генеральної Асамблеї ООН і статут спеціального трибуналу, сформованого ООН та Україною.

Є кілька істотних особливостей нового трибуналу, які деякі, але не всі, з цих існуючих пропозицій поділяють з пропозицією Єльського клубу. Тут я розглядаю елементи трибуналу, які багато хто з тих, що брали участь у дискусії Єльського клубу, вважають основними рисами нового трибуналу.

Три основні риси нового трибуналу

Перша особливість: Трибунал повинен бути міжнародним.

Більшість пропозицій, згаданих вище, вимагають створення міжнародного суду, а не національного, що є ключовою відмінністю з кількох причин. Перший, символічний і виразний: загарбницька війна Росії завдала шкоди не лише Україні, а й міжнародній спільноті в цілому. Другий, практичний: існують імунітети, які, ймовірно, перешкоджатимуть внутрішньому судовому переслідуванню невеликої кількості російських і білоруських посадовців, включаючи президента Володимира Путіна, але які не застосовуватимуться в міжнародному суді. Отже, незважаючи на те, що українське законодавство (та внутрішнє законодавство інших держав) дозволяє притягувати до відповідальності за злочин агресії в національному суді, справи проти найбільш відповідальних за війну було б важко, якщо не неможливо, успішно вести без порушення ключових міжнародно-правових правил імунітету. (Додаткову інформацію про імунітет див. у періодичній доповіді Клауса Кресса щодо рішення Апеляційної палати МКС від 6 травня 2019 року в справі Йорданії щодо апеляції Аль-Башира та коментаря щодо особистої недоторканності (початок на сторінці 2626). Стаття Дженніфер Трахан у цій серії більш широко стосуватиметься питання імунітету).

Третя причина, і, мабуть, найважливіша, хоча й найменш зрозуміла, це українське законодавство, зокрема українська Конституція. Як ми з українським юристом Олександром Комаровим писали кілька місяців тому, стаття 125 Конституції України говорить, що “створення надзвичайних і спеціальних судів не допускається”. Ми пояснили, що ця заборона вимагає, щоб будь-який новий суд був міжнародним. Трибунал також має бути явно допоміжним, а не доповнювати систему національних судів (щоб уникнути конфлікту зі статтею 124 Конституції України). Дійсно, незалежно від того, яка пропозиція буде висунута, світ не повинен заохочувати випадкове ігнорування обмежень української Конституції, особливо в цей момент надзвичайної трансформації для України.

Друга особливість: Трибунал має бути створений через угоду між Україною та Організацією Об’єднаних Націй за рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї.

Проходження через Генеральну Асамблею ООН виконало б обіцянку, яку дали 140 держав, коли вони проголосували за резолюцію, яка висловлює засудження “агресії” Росії “шляхом порушення статті 2(4) Статуту”. Лише п’ять держав, включаючи Росію, проголосували проти. Проходження через Генеральну Асамблею, а не спеціальну коаліцію держав чи європейську інституцію, дозволило б державам з усього світу взяти участь і підтвердити основоположну норму, яку порушила Росія. Це надішле потужне повідомлення про те, що злочин агресії є злочином, незалежно від того, вчинений він у Європі чи деінде. Дійсно, ключовою метою судового переслідування злочину агресії є відновлення міжнародної системи, яку зараз пошкодила Росія, і сигналізування всім країнам, що вони не повинні йти шляхом Росії. Цей відновлення буде справді обмеженим, якщо стосуватиметься лише Європи.

Існують прецеденти, зокрема Надзвичайні палати в судах Камбоджі (створені згідно з рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї) та Спеціальний суд для Сьєрра-Леоне (створений відповідно до рекомендацій Ради Безпеки, яка не діяла згідно з її повноваженнями за розділом VII щодо боротьби із загрозами миру, порушеннями миру та актами агресії). Хоча Генеральна Асамблея не має повноважень нав’язувати Україні трибунал (оскільки вона не має таких повноважень щодо примусу, якими володіє Рада Безпеки), вона може уповноважити Генерального Секретаря працювати з Україною над створенням трибуналу, на який Київ добровільно погоджується через міжнародний договір.

Є ще одна причина для укладення трибуналу як угоди між Україною та ООН: як ми з Комаровим пояснювали, Закон України “Про міжнародні договори” передбачає, що договір між Україною та ООН може підлягати ратифікації Верховною Радою (Парламенту) України і таким чином стати “частиною національного законодавства України”. Президент також міг би домогтися попереднього визнання Конституційним Судом України того, що угода відповідає Конституції, знявши, таким чином, будь-які конституційні сумніви.

Третя особливість: Трибунал має бути обмежений у сфері діяльності

Будь-який новий міжнародний трибунал повинен бути вузько зосереджений на ключових порушеннях, які фундаментально кидають виклик міжнародному правопорядку, і які, ймовірно, залишаться безкарними. Це означає, що злочини, які можуть переслідуватися в МКС або в національних судах, не повинні входити до юрисдикції нового міжнародного трибуналу. Скоріше, трибунал має бути вузько зосереджений лише на злочині агресії і сфокусуватися на тих, хто займає керівні посади. З цією метою новий трибунал має прийняти визначення злочину агресії, що міститься в Римському статуті, яке обмежує сферу переслідування правопорушень “явними” порушеннями Статуту Організації Об’єднаних Націй і злочинами, вчиненими на керівних посадах, а саме шляхом “планування, підготовки, ініціювання або виконання особою, яка має можливість ефективно контролювати або керувати політичними чи військовими діями держави”.

Вторгнення Росії в Україну поставило під загрозу міжнародний правопорядок. Трибунал із такими характеристиками допоміг би відшкодувати шкоду, посиливши фундаментальну для світу важливість заборони застосування сили.

Зображення: учасники засідання Генеральної Асамблеї стоять мовчки під час вшанування британської королеви Єлизавети в штаб-квартирі ООН у Нью-Йорку 15 вересня 2022 року. (Фото Ed JONES/AFP) (Photo by ED JONES/AFP via Getty Images)

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Про автора:

Уна А. Хетевей (@oonahathaway) є виконавчою редакторкою Just Security. Вона також є професоркою міжнародного права Джерарда К. та Берніс Латроуб Сміт у Школі права Єльського університету, професоркою міжнародного права та регіональних досліджень у Центрі МакМіллана Єльського університету, професоркою факультету політичних наук Єльського університету, директоркою Центру глобальних правових проблем Школи права Єльського університету і радницею декана Єльської школи права.

The post Аргументи щодо створення Міжнародного трибуналу для переслідування злочину агресії, вчиненого щодо України appeared first on Just Security.

[Editor’s Note: This article is part of a Just Security series, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine. All articles in the series can be found here.]

The last two weeks have brought promising news that the Ukrainian effort to turn back the Russian army is, miraculously, beginning to succeed. The possible shift in the war brings renewed urgency to a conversation that began shortly after the war started — how to bring accountability for the crime of aggression committed in launching the war in February 2022 and in continuing to pursue the military campaign in clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

This article is the first in a series based on a meeting held in the summer of 2022 at the Yale Club in New York City that aimed to generate a detailed and concrete proposal for a tribunal to try the crime of aggression in Ukraine. The Chair’s summary provides an overview of the meeting – which was hosted by the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the U.N. and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the U.N. and attended by representatives of the Government of Ukraine as well as a number of other U.N. Member States, academics, and members of civil society.

In this series, several of the meeting participants elaborate how the Government of Ukraine and the United Nations could work together to create a tribunal. I begin this series by exploring the case for creating an international tribunal and specifically for doing so through an agreement with the United Nations, acting on the recommendation of the General Assembly. In the next three articles, Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Jennifer Trahan, and former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David J. Scheffer will discuss the features of a potential tribunal. Together, these articles offer a template that could form the foundation for a new international tribunal. Finally, Claus Kreß, special advisor to the ICC prosecutor on the crime of aggression, writing in his personal capacity, will conclude the series.

The Importance of Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression

The stakes of the current conflict are extraordinarily high. When Russia launched its war against Ukraine in February 2022, it began the largest cross-border land war in Europe since World War II. This follows on the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the first conquest of territory in Europe since World War II. These acts stand as a blatant challenge to the global prohibition on the use of force and territorial conquest.

The United Nations Charter that was created at the close of World War II to maintain and sustain international peace places the prohibition on the use of force at its core. Article 2(4) provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” While this prohibition on war has certainly not been perfectly observed, it has contributed to an extraordinary reduction of interstate wars in the postwar era and has made the conquest of territory, which was once common, exceedingly rare. It has enabled trade and growth throughout the globe without fear that the gains will simply become spoils in war. And it has allowed small States that would once have had to fear for their existence to instead survive unmolested. This is no small reason that the number of independent sovereign States has grown roughly threefold from the end of the war to today.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, aided by Belarus, does not just represent the blatant violation of a rule of international law; it represents a threat to the foundational principle that underpins the modern legal order. This is why the global response to the war has been so robust, with States coalescing together to provide arms and other supplies to Ukraine. And it is why that effort must be followed by the criminal prosecution of those most responsible for the crime of aggression.

The crime of aggression was first prosecuted in an international court in the wake of World War II in what would become known as the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The allies charged 24 German political, military, and economic leaders with advanced planning of an aggressive war “in violation of the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928” — the treaty that first outlawed war and thereby set the stage for Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In its judgment, the Nuremberg court declared, “To initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”

That powerful sentence captured an essential fact about the crime of aggression — in war, the crime of aggression is the international crime from which all others flow. Were it not for the illegal aggression against Ukraine, there would be no crimes against humanity, no war crimes, and no genocide. It is, moreover, an attack not just on the country that suffers the physical attack, but an attack on the international community as a whole. This is why establishing a forum to punish such crimes is so essential.

And yet there is no international court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus are not parties to the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC) and gives it jurisdiction. Normally that would mean that the ICC would not have jurisdiction over the events taking place in Ukraine. However, Ukraine submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in 2014 and extended that submission indefinitely in 2015. Based on these submissions, the court can hear cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Ukraine and the prosecutor has begun investigations of those crimes. Yet, due to a political compromise, the crime of aggression is different: unlike the other three crimes in the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression may not be prosecuted against nationals of non-state parties – including Russia and Belarus. While there are proposals to amend that provision, any amendment is likely to take at least a year if it happens at all. And even if made, the revision would most likely apply prospectively, not retroactively. Thus, international accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine almost certainly requires creating a new international tribunal.

The Case for Creating the Tribunal through an Agreement Between Ukraine and the United Nations

The Yale Club meeting offered a proposal for creating a tribunal to try the crime of aggression through an agreement between Ukraine and the United Nations, on the recommendation of the General Assembly.

This is far from the only proposal to create a tribunal to try the crime of aggression in Ukraine. One of the earliest, from former U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, called for the creation of a special tribunal that nations could join in a kind of ad hoc legal “coalition of the willing.” Philippe Sands has been working with European lawmakers to create a tribunal in Europe. Just recently, the Council of Europe adopted a decision endorsing accountability for the crime of aggression. The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) has proposed a draft law for a Ukrainian High War Crimes Court, a specialized court within the domestic Ukrainian judicial system, to prosecute atrocity crimes — including the crime of aggression — not prosecuted at the ICC. The Open Society Justice Initiative has drafted a model indictment that could be used in a number of fora. And there is a proposal similar to the Yale Club’s from the Ukraine Task Force of the Global Accountability Network that proposes a U.N. General Assembly resolution and a statute for a special tribunal formed by the U.N. and Ukraine.

There are several essential features of a new tribunal that some, but not all, of these existing proposals share with the Yale Club proposal. Here I review the elements of a tribunal that many of those who took part in the Yale Club discussion consider essential features of a new tribunal.

Three Essential Features of a New Tribunal

Feature 1: The tribunal should be international. 

Most of the proposals mentioned above call for an international tribunal, rather than a domestic one, a key distinction for several reasons. The first is symbolic and expressive: Russia’s war of aggression has harmed not just Ukraine but the international community as a whole. The second is practical: there are immunities that would likely interfere with domestic prosecution of a small number of Russian and Belarusian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, that would not apply in an international court. Hence, even though Ukrainian law (and other States’ domestic law) permits prosecution for the crime of aggression in a domestic court, cases against those most responsible for the war would be difficult, if not impossible, to pursue successfully without violating key international legal rules on immunity. (For more on immunity, see Claus Kreß’s Occasional Paper on ICC Appeals Chamber’s Judgment of 6 May 2019 in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal and Commentary on personal immunity (beginning on page 2626). Jennifer Trahan’s article in this series will address immunity issues more fully).

The third reason, and perhaps the most important though the least understood, is Ukrainian law, specifically the Ukrainian Constitution. As Ukrainian lawyer Alexander Komarov and I wrote several months ago, Article 125 of the Ukrainian Constitution states that, “The establishment of extraordinary and special courts shall not be permitted.” We explained that this prohibition requires that any new tribunal must be international. The tribunal should also be explicitly auxiliary, not complementary, to the domestic courts (to avoid conflict with Article 124 of the Ukrainian Constitution). Indeed, no matter which proposal moves forward, the world must not encourage casual disregard for the constraints of the Ukrainian Constitution, particularly at this moment of extraordinary transformation for Ukraine.

Feature 2: The tribunal should be created through an agreement between Ukraine and the United Nations, on the recommendation of the General Assembly.

Proceeding through the U.N. General Assembly would make good on a promise that 140 States implied when they voted in favor of a Resolution deploring the “aggression” by Russia “in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter.” Only five States, including Russia, voted against it. Proceeding through the General Assembly, rather than an ad hoc coalition of States or a European institution, would allow States from around the world to participate in and reaffirm the foundational norm that Russia has violated. This would send a powerful message that the crime of aggression is a crime whether committed in Europe or elsewhere. Indeed, a key purpose for prosecuting the crime of aggression is to repair an international system that Russia has now damaged and to signal to all countries that they must not follow in Russia’s footsteps. That repair is limited indeed if it applies to Europe alone.

There are precedents, most notably the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (created pursuant to the recommendation of the General Assembly) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (created pursuant to the recommendation of the Security Council, not acting under its Chapter VII authority to address threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). While the General Assembly does not have the power to impose a tribunal on Ukraine (because it lacks such enforcement powers, which reside in the Security Council), it can authorize the Secretary General to work with Ukraine to establish a tribunal to which Kyiv voluntarily consents through an international agreement.

There is yet another reason to conclude the tribunal as an agreement between Ukraine and the United Nations: As Kamorav and I have explained, the Law of Ukraine on International Treaties provides that a treaty between Ukraine and the U.N. might be made subject to ratification by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine and thus become “part of the national legislation of Ukraine.” It would also be possible for the President to seek an ex ante determination by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine that the agreement is consistent with the Constitution, thus putting any constitutional doubts to rest.

Feature 3: The tribunal should be limited in scope

Any new international tribunal must be narrowly focused on the key violations that fundamentally challenge the international legal order that will likely otherwise go unpunished. This means that crimes that can be prosecuted in the ICC or in domestic courts should not be within the jurisdiction of a new international tribunal. Rather, the tribunal should be narrowly focused on the crime of aggression alone — and it should focus only on those in leadership positions. To this end, the new tribunal should adopt the definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute, which limits the scope of the prosecutable offenses to “manifest” violations of the United Nations Charter and to crimes committed by those in a leadership role, specifically “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put the international legal order in peril. A tribunal with these features would help to repair the damage by reinforcing for the world the foundational importance of the prohibition on use of force.

Image: Attendees of a General Assembly meeting stand in silence during a tribute to Britain’s Queen Elizabeth, at the United Nations headquarters in New York on September 15, 2022. (Photo by Ed JONES / AFP) (Photo by ED JONES/AFP via Getty Images)

The post The Case for Creating an International Tribunal to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine (Part I) appeared first on Just Security.

Now Senators Dick Durbin and Sherrod Brown have introduced the Alien Tort Statute Clarification Act (ATSCA) to reverse Nestlé, in effect, by clarifying Congress’s intent that the ATS does, indeed, apply extraterritorially. The proposed ATSCA provides that “the district courts of the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any tort [covered by the ATS if] . . . an alleged defendant is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . or an alleged defendant is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged defendant.”

If adopted, this legislation would help ensure that the United States is not a safe haven for individuals who violate human rights abroad and then come here. It would also allow victims to sue corporations that aid and abet human rights violations abroad to the extent those corporations are subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States. The ATSCA would be an important step toward accountability for some of the worst human rights abusers and those who assist them, perpetrators who otherwise might avoid accountability altogether.

Background

The ATS, which was enacted by the First Congress in 1789, provides, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In less technical terms, it allows any person who is not a citizen of the United States to sue defendants who are subject to jurisdiction in the United States for money damages in U.S. federal court for violating their rights under international law.

This law was used only occasionally until 1980, when the Second Circuit held in Filártiga v. Peña‑Irala that the ATS could be the basis for a civil suit against a Paraguayan police inspector for torturing to death the son of a political dissident. After this decision, two new strands of cases emerged—one directed at U.S. and foreign government officials and the other at corporations that aided and abetted international law violations. The first new strand ran into significant immunity bars, which (as discussed below) limited the suits that could move forward. The second strand met with modest success and resulted in a few large settlements against corporations.

A turning point came in 2013, when the Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Subsequent decisions continued to narrow the claims that could be brought under the ATS. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Court held that foreign corporations could not be sued under the ATS. Most recently, in Nestlé, the Supreme Court held that U.S. corporations could not be sued for aiding and abetting child slavery in Ivory Coast because their conduct within the United States amounted only to general corporate decision-making while all other activity related to the allegations occurred abroad.

Although the Supreme Court has chipped away at the ATS for years, it had always left the Filártiga decision intact—until its decision in Nestlé. There it cast doubt for the first time on the Filártiga model permitting claims against human rights violators who later come to the United States.

The Supreme Court has long said that it “would welcome any congressional guidance” about what claims should be actionable under the ATS. In Nestlé, Justice Clarence Thomas emphasized that “[w]hether and to what extent defendants should be liable under the ATS . . . lies within the province of the Legislative Branch,” and Justice Neil Gorsuch said that responsibility for determining the proper scope of the ATS cause of action belongs “[w]ith the people’s elected representatives.” The ATSCA responds to such calls for congressional direction.

Cases the Act Would Make Possible

The ATSCA would resolve any questions that exist about cases like the one brought by the Filártigas. This is important because by one count there are close to 1,700 alleged human rights violators and war criminals here in the United States. Many of them are living comfortable lives in the United States after causing untold misery in their home countries. The ATSCA would make clear that an important purpose of the ATS is to deprive those who have committed offenses abroad from escaping justice by simply relocating to the United States.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights the urgency of ensuring accountability mechanisms are in place for those who violate human rights and commit war crimes abroad. On May 18, 2022, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced the Justice for Victims of War Crimes Act, which would amend the United States’ existing war crimes statute to permit criminal prosecutions even when both the perpetrators and the victims are not U.S. nationals. As Senator Chuck Grassley said, “The United States must not be a safe haven for war criminals looking to escape justice in their home country.” The proposed amendment of the war crimes statute would authorize criminal liability, which is important. But another critical form of accountability is enabling victims to recover damages from perpetrators. The ATSCA would strengthen civil remedies under the ATS by clarifying Congress’s intent to allow Ukrainian victims of war crimes and other victims of human rights violations abroad to seek compensation from perpetrators who later come to the United States.

The ATSCA would also allow victims to sue corporations that aid and abet war crimes and human rights violations abroad. While many companies have curtailed their operations in Russia, others have not. The ATS does not make companies liable simply for doing business in countries that violate human rights, and the ATSCA would not change this. But the ATSCA would permit victims to sue companies that aid or abet such abuses by, for example, selling computer chips to Russia knowing or intending that those chips will be used in weapons that target civilians. Such companies are most likely to be foreign, because U.S. sanctions prohibit U.S. companies from selling such goods to Russia, which may raise issues of personal jurisdiction as we discuss below.

It would also make it possible to hold responsible companies that have helped China target political dissidents and religious organizations. In Wang v. Yahoo!, two Chinese pro-democracy activists alleged that Yahoo!, a U.S. corporation, gave information from their emails to Chinese officials, leading to their detention and torture. Yahoo settled the case for more than $23 million. In Ning v. Oath Holdings, another Chinese pro-democracy activist made similar allegations against Yahoo!. In Doe v. Cisco Systems, plaintiffs alleged that Cisco, another U.S. corporation, designed and helped maintain China’s Golden Shield security system, in collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party and public security officials, knowing that the system would be used to violate the human rights of Falun Gong practitioners. Both Ning and Doe are currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. While they may ultimately be dismissed, the ATSCA would ensure that they will not be dismissed simply because they apply to extraterritorial conduct.

Most important, by closing these gaps, the ATSCA ensures that companies that respect human rights do not have to compete unfairly with companies that knowingly enable human rights violations. To return to the Nestlé case that prompted the ATSCA legislation, Nestlé and Cargill, the defendant in the sister case, were allegedly able to purchase raw cocoa at lower prices because they bought from plantations that used child slave labor. That makes it difficult for cocoa companies that do not purchase cocoa made with child slave labor to compete in the free market—because their costs are higher. Ensuring that the ATS extends to extraterritorial conduct simply puts these companies on a level playing field, by making it possible for those harmed by their illegal conduct to hold them responsible.

Existing Law Is Not Sufficient

Although Congress has previously provided civil liability against those who violate human rights, often with bipartisan support, the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the ATS cause of action has left substantial gaps.

In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which provides an express cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing under color of foreign law. But the TVPA does not apply to other human rights violations like genocide or war crimes. In addition, the Supreme Court held in 2012 that the TVPA applies only to natural persons and therefore does not allow corporations to be sued. The House and Senate Reports accompanying the TVPA make clear Congress’s intention that the ATS “should not be replaced” and “should remain intact” to address cases beyond the scope of the TVPA, an intention that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have undercut. By amending the ATS to apply extraterritorially, the ATSCA would restore the ATS to its former scope, allowing it to reach claims that the TPVA does not.

In 2003, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which added a civil cause of action for victims of slavery, forced labor, and human trafficking against anyone, including corporations, who knowingly benefits from such violations. In 2008, Congress further amended the TVPRA to apply extraterritorially. But the TVPRA applies only to offenses such as slavery, forced labor, and human trafficking, and not to other human rights violations like torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, and war crimes. The ATSCA would amend the ATS to provide a civil remedy for other human rights violations abroad in the same way that the TVPRA provides a civil remedy for the violations that it covers. In fact, the ATSCA takes its language on extraterritoriality directly from the TVPRA, so that the two statutes would apply extraterritorially to the same extent.

Foreign Relations Implications

When the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for human rights violations in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Court noted that “the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Sosa addressed that concern by limiting the ATS cause of action to human rights norms that are generally accepted and specifically defined—like torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, and war crimes. The ATSCA would leave the Sosa standard in place, limiting ATS cases to the most serious violations of human rights, which are widely condemned by the world community.

Other doctrines will also mitigate the foreign relations implications of amending the ATS to apply extraterritorially. First, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities are immune from suit in U.S. courts unless an exception to immunity applies. The FSIA has no general exception for human rights claims, although other exceptions (like the terrorism exceptions) sometimes allow such claims to be brought. The ATSCA would not create any new exceptions to foreign states’ immunities.

Second, foreign officials will also sometimes be entitled to immunity. Accredited foreign diplomats are almost completely immune from civil suits under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Foreign heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under federal common law during their tenure in office. Lower-level officials and all former officials are entitled to conduct-based immunity for acts taken in their official capacities. U.S. courts, often with the benefit of input from the executive branch, have used the rules of conduct-based immunity to distinguish claims that should not go forward from claims that should.

Third, foreign corporations will often be protected from suit in U.S. courts from claims arising abroad by the rules of personal jurisdiction. U.S. courts lack general jurisdiction over most foreign corporations. And, for specific jurisdiction to exist, the claims must “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts” with the United States. The ATSCA’s findings indicate a purpose to extend the scope of the ATS as far as the rules of personal jurisdiction will allow. But in the case of foreign corporations, the rules of personal jurisdiction may not allow much.

At the same time, there could be significant foreign relations benefits from the ATSCA. Indeed, one reason the First Congress passed the ATS in 1789 was to avoid foreign relations problems by giving non-citizens a remedy for international law violations for which other countries might hold the United States responsible. It was precisely this history that led Gorsuch to distinguish claims against U.S. companies from claims against foreign companies in his Jesner concurrence: “It is one thing for courts to assume the task of creating new causes of action to ensure our citizens abide by the law of nations and avoid reprisals against this country. It is altogether another thing for courts to punish foreign parties for conduct that could not be attributed to the United States and thereby risk reprisals against this country.” Other countries, like Canada and the United Kingdom, are increasingly holding their own companies to account for human rights violations and other illicit conduct abroad. Far from causing problems for U.S. foreign relations, amending the ATS to apply to U.S. companies when they act abroad to help foreign governments suppress dissent or religious freedom is only likely to strengthen U.S. standing abroad.

Indeed, it is worth considering the foreign relations implications of not amending the ATS to apply extraterritorially. The United States has long been a leader in international human rights. When the Filátiga case was pending before the Second Circuit, the U.S. government filed an amicus brief urging that the ATS should be used to hear human rights claims. When “there is a consensus in the international community that the right is protected and that there is a widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection,” the brief noted, “there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protection of human rights.”

Conclusion

The ATSCA is a modest but important piece of legislation. Answering the Supreme Court’s repeated calls for congressional guidance, it makes clear that Congress intends the ATS to provide a remedy for human rights violations abroad when individual perpetrators come to the United States and when corporations that aid and abet such violations are subject to personal jurisdiction here. The ATSCA would work in tandem with the TVPA and TVPRA, other laws that have received bipartisan support, to cover cases that those statutes do not reach. Any negative foreign relations implications are addressed by the limits Sosa has placed on the ATS cause of action, as well as the existing rules of immunity and personal jurisdiction. And the positive foreign relations implications should not be ignored. By denying safe haven to individual perpetrators and by discouraging corporations subject to U.S. jurisdiction from aiding and abetting human rights violations abroad, Congress can bolster the United States’ status as a defender of human rights. This legislation deserves bipartisan support.

IMAGE: People collect cocoa beans at a cocoa exporter’s in Abidjan, on July 3, 2019. (Photo by Sia KAMBOU / Getty Images)

The post Answering the Supreme Court’s Call for Guidance on the Alien Tort Statute appeared first on Just Security.

As Russia continues to wage a horrific war of aggression in Ukraine, the question of how to prosecute the ongoing violation of the most fundamental criminal prohibition of the international legal order is on many diplomats’ and others’ minds. The issue of how to design a criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression has received extensive commentary in recent weeks.  In an earlier article for Just Security, we outlined the challenges posed by the Ukrainian Constitution and a 2001 decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) to the creation of an accountability mechanism—and therefore to some of the leading proposals for creating a new court.  But what path should Ukraine and the international community take to achieve accountability?

The most promising way forward, under both Ukrainian and international law, is to create an international court by means of an international treaty between the government of Ukraine and the United Nations (UN), on the recommendation of the General Assembly (UNGA), for the purpose of trying the crime of aggression. Indeed, even if other policy reasons might count in favor of a different model, the model we identify has significant advantages, including that it avoids Ukrainian constitutional challenges and international legal constraints.

This approach would be similar to that taken in creating the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and, in important respects, the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  We recommend, moreover, that the President of Ukraine, members of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine request the CCU review the treaty before it is submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for ratification. There are several reasons to favor this approach. 

First, unlike in a domestic court, head of state immunity and other status immunities would be inapplicable to a prosecution in an international court. Additionally, whereas there is some uncertainty as to the applicability of so-called “functional immunities” for officials in aggression prosecutions before domestic courts, such immunities would clearly not be applicable before an international court.  Tom Dannenbaum, writing for Just Security, explains that “prosecution outside of the national courts of the accused could implicate both functional immunities, applicable to all state officials for acts undertaken in their official capacity, and status immunities, applicable to sitting heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers.”  He concludes, however, that functional immunity would “be out of place in the context of an international crime that is by definition a state act,” (the crime of aggression); and even if functional immunity somehow applied, there’s reason to believe it would be limited to prosecutions before national, not international, courts. In addition, he shows that there is substantial support for the conclusion that status immunities do not apply to the prosecution of international crimes by international courts. He concludes that “[i]f it is correct to say that status immunities do not apply before international courts qua international courts, a court created by the General Assembly would have the strongest claim to that status.” In sum, Vladimir Putin and other members of the senior leadership in Russia would be unlikely to be able to rely on such immunities if prosecuted in an international court for the crime of aggression.

Second, an international court is preferable to a hybrid court for both international and domestic reasons.  First, any hybrid court would also face some uncertainty about whether status (and possibly functional) immunities would apply.  There is reason to think that they do not, insofar as the hybrid court can credibly be characterized as international. The SCSL invoked its international character in holding that Charles Taylor did not enjoy immunity even though he was the serving Head of State of Liberia at the time criminal proceedings were initiated. Nonetheless, the case is less clear cut than for an international court.  Second, depending on how it is designed, a hybrid court might violate Article 125 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which prohibits any “special or extraordinary court,” a topic we discussed in detail in our earlier Just Security article.

Third, creating the court through an agreement between Ukraine and the UN on the recommendation of the UNGA would ensure that the new court is on firm international legal ground and safeguard the court’s legitimacy.  Some have raised the concern that creating an independent ad hoc court could exceed the powers of the General Assembly. But that does not present a concern as long as there is an agreement with the state on whose territory the crimes were committed—here Ukraine. As noted above, there are two precedents for this approach.  The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were created by agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia, upon the recommendation of the General Assembly (the Chambers were domestic, not international, but the same procedure could be used to create an international court).  The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created by agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, upon recommendation by the Security Council (which was not acting under its Chapter VII authority).   

Concluding an agreement between the UN and Ukraine to create a court has advantages over creating a special tribunal through agreement among a group of willing states. A tribunal created by a few states would not have the legitimacy of one created by an organization that represents the international community.  Some point to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) as precedent, but it is important to note that the IMT was created before the United Nations was formed.  Indeed, the group of states that founded the IMT went on soon after to found the United Nations.  Today, a special tribunal formed by a group of states outside the United Nations is less likely to be viewed as legitimate.  Such a special tribunal would likely also face charges of selective justice. Some states may be wary, moreover, of creating a precedent that could be followed by other states with less defensible purposes.  After all, if Ukraine and a small number of like-minded states can create an international court, why could Russia and Belarus not do the same?

This approach also has advantages over a court concluded by agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe (CoE).  Kevin Jon Heller proposes establishing a hybrid tribunal under the auspices of the CoE–an “Extraordinary Ukrainian Chamber for Aggression” (EUCA). Heller’s proposal would take advantage of the CCU’s approval of an existing CoE institution–the European Court of Human Rights. But, as we explained earlier, the new kind of court he proposed is likely to run afoul of Article 125 of the Ukrainian Constitution. Heller, it is important to note, contests this characterization of Ukrainian constitutional law, arguing that the new court would fit within Part 4 of Article 125, which explicitly allows for the operation of “high specialized courts.” He notes that the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) falls into this exception (and, indeed, the Law of Ukraine On the High Anti-Corruption Court specifically identifies HACC as a “high specialized court”).  A new court to try the crime of aggression following this example would, he suggests, similarly avoid constitutional difficulty.  The HAAC currently faces constitutional challenge in the CCU, but assuming it survives that challenge, it is important to note key differences between Heller’s proposed EUCA and the HACC. The HACC is not a hybrid court but is a fully domestic court. Even though there has been substantial international involvement in its creation and operation, these efforts were in support of Ukraine’s own domestic process. There is no formal international authority over the court, direct international funding, or any non-Ukrainian judges (and, indeed, the Ukrainian Constitution expressly provides that only citizens of Ukraine can be appointed as judges in national courts and it requires that national courts must be funded solely from the State Budget of Ukraine).  Moreover, the HACC is a permanent court created to address a specific category of cases (corruption involving senior officials). The EUCA would presumably be a temporary court to try the crimes of aggression committed in the current war—and thus more likely to run afoul of Article 125.  Last, even if following the HAAC example by setting up a new domestic court with international support solved the constitutional concerns, it would create a new problem: Prosecutions in the new domestic court would face both status and functional immunities that are likely not available in an international court.   

A modified version  might be to create the court as an international court through a treaty between Ukraine and the CoE, rather than through a treaty between Ukraine and the UN.  But both Heller’s and this modified approach would face a challenging practical problem: each would require unanimity among the members of the CoE, including Hungary and Serbia. 

Fourth, creating the court through concluding a treaty between Ukraine and the United Nations ensures that the court will be consistent with Ukrainian law and provides a path to insulating it from future constitutional challenge. The Law of Ukraine on International Treaties of Ukraine provides that a treaty between Ukraine and the UN might be made subject to ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.  According to the Ukrainian Constitution, treaties in force ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “shall be a part of the national legislation of Ukraine” (Art. 9). The Constitution provides, moreover for ex ante review by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) of the international treaties submitted for ratification, “at the request of the President of Ukraine, or at least forty-five MPs of Ukraine, or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” (Art. 151). An ex ante determination by the CCU that the agreement is consistent with the Constitution, together with ratification of the treaty by Verkhovna Rada, would preemptively resolve any domestic legal concerns that may otherwise arise.

To avoid any constitutional concerns that may arise during ex ante review, the agreement between Ukraine and the UN should specify that the new court will be international, not domestic or hybrid (avoiding conflict with Art. 125). It should also specify that the court is auxiliary, not complementary, to the domestic courts (avoiding conflict with Art. 124) – matters we discussed earlier at Just Security.  

Fifth, while some prosecutions for the crime of aggression might go forward in domestic court under Article 437 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, it is important not to rely exclusively on Ukrainian courts. First, as noted above, national courts may run into significant legal difficulties due to status and functional immunities for senior Russian officials. Second, the prosecution against former President Viktor Yanukovych has been criticized for proceeding in the absence of the defendant, and such trials in absentia generally are considered to raise human rights concerns. Any similar trials would likely meet similar international criticism and repel UN and foreign support.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on April 9, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen declared, “Will the right of might be the rule or will it be the rule of law . . . this is what is at stake in this war.”  Establishing an international court through an agreement between the United Nations and Ukraine would be an important step toward providing legal accountability for the crime of aggression and for the rule of law to prevail.

Photo credit: Constitutional Court of Ukraine 

The post The Best Path for Accountability for the Crime of Aggression Under Ukrainian and International Law appeared first on Just Security.

Олександр Комаров і Уна Хетеуей

В той час як Росія продовжує вести жахливу агресивну війну в Україні, питання про те, як переслідувати в судовому порядку продовжуване порушення найфундаментальнішої кримінальної заборони міжнародного правового порядку, хвилює розуми багатьох дипломатів та інших людей. Протягом останніх тижнів питання про те, як створити кримінальний трибунал для злочину агресії, отримало широке обговорення. У попередній статті для Just Security ми висвітлювали виклики, пов’язані з вимогами Конституції України та рішенням Конституційного Суду України (КСУ) від 2001 року щодо створення механізму відповідальності –  і, отже, деякі з основних пропозицій щодо створення нового суду. Але яким шляхом слід піти Україні та міжнародній спільноті, щоб досягти відповідальності?

Найперспективнішим шляхом, як за українським, так і за міжнародним правом, є створення міжнародного суду за допомогою міжнародного договору між урядом України та ООН (ООН) за рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї (ГА ООН) з метою розгляду злочину агресії. Насправді, навіть якщо певні політичні причини можуть говорити на користь іншої моделі, модель, яку ми пропонуємо, має значні переваги, зокрема те, що вона уникає українських конституційних викликів та міжнародно-правових обмежень.

Цей підхід буде подібним до того, що було використано при створенні Надзвичайних палат у судах Камбоджі та, у важливих аспектах, Спеціального суду для Сьєрра-Леоне. Крім того, ми рекомендуємо Президенту України, депутатам Верховної Ради України чи Кабінету Міністрів України звернутися до КСУ висновки про відповідність Конституції України цього договір до того, як він буде внесений до Верховної Ради України для надання згоди на його обов’язковість. Є кілька причин віддати перевагу такому підходу.

По-перше, на відміну від національного суду, імунітет глави держави та інші статусні імунітети не будуть застосовуватися до обвинувачення в міжнародному суді. Крім того, хоча й існує певна невизначеність щодо застосування так званих «функціональних імунітетів» до посадових осіб при переслідуванні агресії у національних судах, такі імунітети, очевидно, не будуть застосовуватися в міжнародному суді. Том Данненбаум, у своєму дописі для Just Security, пояснює, що «переслідування обвинувачених поза національними судами може включати як функціональні імунітети, які застосовуються до всіх державних службовців за дії, вчинені в їх офіційній якості, так і статусні імунітети, застосовні до діючих глав держав, глав урядів та міністрів закордонних справ». Однак він робить висновок, що функціональний імунітет «був би недоречним у контексті міжнародного злочину, який за визначенням є актом держави» (злочин агресії); і навіть якщо функціональний імунітет якимось чином застосовується, є підстави вважати, що він обмежиться переслідуванням у національних, а не міжнародних судах. Крім того, він показує, що існує суттєва підтримка висновку про те, що статусні імунітети не застосовуються до переслідування міжнародних злочинів міжнародними судами. Він робить висновок, що «якщо правильно сказати, що статусні імунітети не застосовуються в міжнародних судах оскільки вони є міжнародними, то суд, створений Генеральною Асамблеєю, матиме найбільші претензії на цей статус». Загалом, Володимир Путін та інші члени вищого керівництва Росії навряд чи зможуть покладатися на такий імунітет, якщо їх переслідуватимуть у міжнародному суді за злочин агресії.

По-друге, міжнародний суд є кращим за гібридний суд як з міжнародних, так і з внутрішніх причин. По-перше, будь-який гібридний суд також зіткнеться з певною невизначеністю щодо того, чи застосовуватимуться статусні (і, можливо, функціональні) імунітети. Є підстави вважати, що вони не застосовуватимуться, оскільки гібридний суд можна правдоподібно охарактеризувати як міжнародний. Спеціальний суд для Сьєрра-Леоне посилався на свій міжнародний характер, постановляючи, що Чарльз Тейлор не користувався імунітетом, навіть не зважаючи на те, що він перебував главою держави Ліберія на момент порушення кримінального провадження. Тим не менш, ситуація з імунітетами у гібридному суд є менш однозначною, ніж щодо міжнародного суду. По-друге, залежно від того, як він запроектований, гібридний суд може порушити статтю 125 Конституції України, яка забороняє створення будь-яких «надзвичайних або особливих судів», тему, яку ми детально обговорювали в нашій попередній статті про справедливу безпеку.

По-третє, створення суду на основі договору між Україною та ООН за рекомендацією ГА ООН гарантуватиме, що новий суд буде існувати на міцній міжнародно-правовій основі та захистить легітимність суду. Дехто висловив занепокоєння, що створення незалежного суду ad hoc може перевищити повноваження Генеральної Асамблеї. Але це не викликає занепокоєння, доки існує домовленість з державою, на території якої скоєні злочини, — в цьому випадку з Україною. Як зазначалося вище, існує два прецеденти такого підходу. Надзвичайні палати в судах Камбоджі були створені за згодою між Організацією Об’єднаних Націй і Камбоджею за рекомендацією Генеральної Асамблеї (палати були національними, а не міжнародними, але така ж процедура могла бути використана і для створення міжнародного суду). Спеціальний суд для Сьєрра-Леоне був створений за угодою між Організацією Об’єднаних Націй і Сьєрра-Леоне за рекомендацією Ради Безпеки (яка не діяла відповідно до своїх повноважень, визначених у розділі VII).

Укладення угоди між ООН та Україною про створення суду має переваги перед створенням спеціального трибуналу за домовленістю між групою держав, які висловили таке бажання. Трибунал, створений кількома державами, не матиме би легітимності трибуналу, створеного організацією, яка представляє міжнародне співтовариство. Дехто вказує на Міжнародний Військовий Трибунал у Нюрнберзі (МВТ) як на прецедент, але важливо зазначити, що МВТ був створений до створення Організації Об’єднаних Націй. Насправді, група держав, яка заснувала МВТ, незабаром після цього заснувала Організацію Об’єднаних Націй. Сьогодні спеціальний трибунал, утворений групою держав поза межами Організації Об’єднаних Націй, з меншою ймовірністю буде вважатися легітимним. Такому спеціальному трибуналу, ймовірно, також висунуть звинувачення у вибірковому правосудді. Більше того, деякі держави можуть побоюватися створення прецеденту, який могли б наслідувати інші держави з менш виправданими цілями. Зрештою, якщо Україна та невелика кількість держав-однодумців можуть створити міжнародний суд, чому Росія та Білорусь не можуть зробити те саме?

Запропонований нами підхід також має переваги перед судом, укладеним за угодою між Україною та Радою Європи (РЄ). Кевін Джон Хеллер пропонує створити гібридний трибунал під егідою Ради Європи – «Надзвичайну українську палату з питань агресії» (НУППА). Пропозиція Хеллера скористалася б перевагою схвалення КСУ існуючої інституції Ради Європи – Європейського суду з прав людини. Але, як ми пояснювали раніше, запропонований ним новий вид суду, ймовірно, буде суперечити статті 125 Конституції України. Важливо відзначити, що Хеллер заперечує таке тлумачення українського конституційного права, стверджуючи, що новий суд вписується в частину 4 статті 125 Конституції України, яка прямо передбачає функціонування «вищих спеціалізованих судів». Він зазначає, що Вищий антикорупційний суд (ВАКС) підпадає під цей виняток (і, дійсно, Закон України «Про Вищий антикорупційний суд» конкретно визначає ВАКС як «вищий спеціалізований суд»). Новий суд для розгляду злочину агресії, за прикладом ВАКС, як він вважає, так само уникне конституційних труднощів. Наразі відповідність ВАКС Конституції оскаржується в КСУ, але, якщо припустити, що ВАКС буде визнаний конституційним, важливо відзначити ключові відмінності між запропонованими Хеллером НУППА та ВАКС. ВАКС не є гібридним судом, а є повністю національним. Незважаючи на те, що в його створенні та роботі було значне міжнародне залучення, ці зусилля були на підтримку внутрішнього процесу України. Не існує офіційного міжнародного керівництва судом, прямого міжнародного фінансування чи будь-яких суддів, які не є громадянами України, у складі суду (і, справді, Конституція України прямо передбачає, що суддями в національних судах можуть бути призначені лише громадяни України, і вона вимагає, щоб національні суди фінансувалися з Державного бюджету України). Крім того, ВАКС є постійно діючим судом, створеним для вирішення конкретної категорії справ (корупція за участю вищих посадових осіб). НУППА, імовірно, буде тимчасовим судом для розгляду злочинів агресії, скоєних у нинішній війні, і, таким чином, швидше за все, буде порушено статтю 125 Конституції України. Нарешті, навіть якщо слідуючи прикладу ВАКС шляхом створення нового національного суду за міжнародної підтримки буде вирішено конституційні проблеми, це створить нову проблему: обвинувачення в новому національному суді стикатимуться як із статусними, так і з функціональними імунітетами, які, з високою часткою імовірності, відсутні в міжнародному суді.

Модифікованою версією може бути створення суду як міжнародного через договір між Україною та РЄ, а не через договір між Україною та ООН. Але і підхід Хеллера, і цей модифікований підхід зіткнулися б зі складною практичною проблемою: обидва ці рішення вимагали б одностайності членів РЄ, включаючи Угорщину та Сербію.

По-четверте, створення суду шляхом укладення договору між Україною та Організацією Об’єднаних Націй гарантує відповідність суду українському законодавству та забезпечує шлях до його захисту від майбутнього конституційного оскарження. Законом України «Про міжнародні договори України» передбачено, що договір між Україною та ООН може підлягати ратифікації Верховною Радою України. Згідно з Конституцією України, чинні договори, згода на обов’язковість яких надана Верховною Радою України, «є частиною національного законодавства України» (ст. 9). Крім того, Конституція передбачає можливість попередньої (ex–ante) перевірки Конституційним Судом України (КСУ) міжнародних договорів, які подаються на ратифікацію, «за зверненням Президента України, або щонайменше сорока п’яти народних депутатів України, або Кабінету Міністрів України» (ст. 151). Попередній висновок КСУ про те, що договір відповідає Конституції, разом із наданням згоди на обов’язковість цього договору Верховною Радою дозволить завчасно вирішити будь-які внутрішні правові проблеми, які можуть виникнути в іншому випадку.

Щоб уникнути будь-яких конституційних проблем, які можуть виникнути під час попередньої перевірки, в угоді між Україною та ООН має бути зазначено, що новий суд буде міжнародним, а не внутрішнім чи змішаним (гібридним) (уникаючи конфлікту зі ст. 125). Слід також уточнити, що суд є допоміжним, а не доповнюючим, до національних судів (уникаючи конфлікту зі статтею 124) – питання, які ми обговорювали раніше на Just Security.

По-п’яте, хоча деякі судові переслідування за злочин агресії можуть бути проведені у національних судах за статтею 437 Кримінального кодексу України, важливо не покладатися виключно на українські суди. По-перше, як зазначалося вище, національні суди можуть зіткнутися зі значними юридичними труднощами через статусні і функціональні імунітети для вищих російських чиновників. По-друге, судове переслідування проти колишнього президента Віктора Януковича було піддано критиці за те, що воно відбувалось за відсутності підсудного, і заочні судові процеси, як правило, викликають занепокоєння щодо прав людини. Будь-які подібні судові процеси, ймовірно, зустрінуть подібну міжнародну критику та відштовхнуть підтримку ООН та іноземних держав.

Виступаючи разом із Президентом України Володимиром Зеленським у Києві 9 квітня, Президент Європейської Комісії Урсула фон дер Ляєн заявила: «Чи буде право сили верховним чи буде це верховенство права. . . ось що поставлено на карту в цій війні». Створення міжнародного суду на основі угоди між ООН та Україною було б важливим кроком до забезпечення юридичної відповідальності за злочин агресії та верховенства права.

Photo credit: Constitutional Court of Ukraine 

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